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Salmon P. Chase: Chief Justice
David F. Hughes*
Professor Hughes here makes an overall survey of Salmon P. Chase
as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The author
details how, through a blend of subtlety, utter wilfulness, and personal
integrity, Chief Justice Chase became, in most instances, an effective
leader of the Court.
I.
This article is not an in-depth study of some aspect of Salmon P.
Chase's career as Chief Justice. Nor is it a survey of his judicial career.
Rather, it is an attempt to present an overall view of Chase as Chief
Justice through an examination of a limited number of topics. Such
an approach seemed appropriate, for the sweep of his days on the
Court are not well enough known to make a detailed study of one
aspect of his career particularly valuable, nor is enough known about
him to make a summary more than an exercise in superficiality. In
finally placing this effort on what is hopefully a feasible ground some-
where between breadth and depth, I find myself beset with misgivings,
some of which should be shared.
Many signal events in Chase's career as Chief Justice are put to one
side. The Legal Tender episodes, the impeachment trial of Andrew
Johnson (probably Chase's moment of greatest public triumph as a
judicial figure), his strong role in settling vexing legal and constitut-
tional problems growing out of the Civil War, and his political
adventures while on the bench are barely alluded to, not to mention
many significant areas unnoticed by even an allusion. On the other
hand, I find my prose is too often compelled to hasten over events
and on to swift conclusions with little pause to share the reasoning and
evidence with the reader. Lastly, and most important, I am struck
by the way in which Chase tends to emerge on the pages that follow
*Assistant Professor of Government, Centre College of Kentucky.
I could write a book and do nothing but thank those who have helped me in my
work on Chase. Surely the financial assistance rendered by the American Philosophical
Society and Centre College should be acknowledged with thanks. My research
assistant, Frank Edelen of Centre College, has faithfully labored at the considerable
task of informing his employer. In the shadow of a deadline, no less than four typists
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as a politician only incidentally on the bench, largely lacking in a
proper sense of the judicial responsibilities of his office. Such a
picture is a distortion, and if I have drawn it so, the result comes as
an unintentional, unjust and regretted byproduct of the subjects it
seemed best to discuss. I hope that the pages which follow will,
nevertheless, be valuable as a cameo presentation of the last stage
of the public life of a major figure in American politics and judicial
history.
II. LiNcOL.N'S CimF JusTICE
When the news spread that Salmon Portland Chase had at last be-
come the sixth Chief Justice of the United States, radical Republicans1
could not withhold their joy. "Surely," one wrote, "God has spared
the life of the late Chief Justice until the fulness of time. His hand
we now see. . ."2 John Stevens of New York enthused that the ap-
pointment was "the greatest civil war victory won . . . during Mr.
Lincoln's administration."3 "The pulses of the nation beat a joyful
accord and freedom's altar fires rekindle with illimitable blaze" at
the appointment, according to Alabama's very radical federal district
judge.
4
Others were not so pleased. Crusty old Gideon Welles, Lincoln's
Secretary of the Navy, had growled that Chase as an appointee was
inpossible,"5 and Thomas Ewing of Ohio described the nominee as
"knavish, dishonest and corrupt."6 Within Lincoln's own office one of
his secretaries thought that when Chase had left his post as Secretary
of the Treasury, he had been "relegated to private life, where he
belonged, and where he should have remained."7
That feelings ran to abnormal extremes at his appointment was only
normal in Chase's life. Few were indifferent about Salmon P. Chase.
Indeed, this man whom Lincoln now elevated had been in effect fired
by the President as Secretary of the Treasury only the preceding June,
after leading the Treasury through the bulk of the agonizing task of
1. I am aware that Professor Eric McKitrick has demonstrated that the cohesiveness
and permanence of the group known as "radicals," was much less solid than had
previously been supposed. Nevertheless, there was a distinguishable group identi-
fiable as radicals with a generally common political orientation. See McKmucc,
ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCnON (1960).
2. Letter from E. G. Cook to Salmon P. Chase [hereinafter referred to as SPO]
December 7, 1864, Library of Congress, Chase MSS., Vol. 93.
3. Letter From John Stevens to SPC, December 30, 1864, New York Public Library,
Misc. MSS., John Stevens.
4. Letter From Richard Busteed and Rufus F. Andrews to SPC, December 7, 1864,
Library of Congress, Chase MSS., Vol. 93.
5. II THE DmRy OF GmEON WELLEs 183 (Beale ed. 1960).
6. II THE DrLaY OF GEORGE TE MPwro STRONo 592 (Nevins & Thomas ed. 1952).
7. CuLLom, Fnmry YEARS OF PuBnuc SEmvicE 94 (1911).
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financing the greatest war-bill ever presented to that time. Chase had
become an intolerable political burden to President Lincoln. Especi-
ally was this true in regard to certain treasury posts which the
President needed for patronage purposes in the coming election.
This was most touchy in the lucrative New York Custom House and
Treasury Office, from which the friends of Secretary of State William
H. Seward and New York Republican Leader, Thurlow Weed, were
excluded. Lincoln needed New York support at the Republican
National Convention. Chase refused to cooperate. In June, 1864, he
needlessly gave Lincoln the opportunity the President wanted. After
a compromise settlement satisfactory to Chase had been reached in a
dispute over an important post in the New York Treasury Office,
Chase petulantly appended another of his long series of resignations
to a letter that at least temporarily closed the affair. Lincoln hastily
accepted. Chase suddenly and most unexpectedly found himself out
in the political arctic waste. To many Republican "moderates," his
removal was a Godsend. To Republican "radicals," it was yet another
stab in their backs by a perfidious President.
Ironically, the deep antipathy which developed within the Radicals
toward Lincoln probably had no little to do with Chase's appointment
as Chief Justice. Shortly after Chase's unexpected departure from the
Treasury had seemingly struck at the radical faction, the President had
vetoed the Wade-Davis Reconstruction Bill. In attempting to steer a
middle course between the radicals and moderates in the Repub-
lican Party, Lincoln had been increasingly at odds with Chase's
radical friends. His generous amnesty proclamation of December 8,
1863 had probably stimulated the boomlet for Chase as an alternative
Republican candidate for President. The Chase movement first gained
substance at a meeting on December 9.8 The feeling against the
President ran so deep that certain radicals proposed to run General
John C. Fremont as a third candidate in 1864, hoping to force Lincoln
oui of the race. This movement did not die until the early fall. One
of the uses the President made of the empty Chief Justice's chair was
to keep Chase and his friends "honest" about the election. In addition,
before Taney at last expired,9 Lincoln had repeatedly assured leading
supporters of Chase that when the vacancy came, Chase would come
to the Court.10 To have reneged on his promise would scarcely have
8. The Original Chase Meeting and the Next Presidential Election, 23 Miss. VALEY
HiST. REv. 62-63 (1936) [Hereinafter this journal is cited, as MVHR].
9. Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney died on October 12, 1864. He had been in
ill health for years.
10. Letter From Charles Sumner to SPC., October 24, 1864, Library of Congress,
Chase MSS., Second Series, Vol. 3. II THE DLARY oF Own.LE I-RcK.mA BRoWNI G
686 (Pease & Randall eds. 1931); CuLLom, op. cit. supra note 7, at 686-87. Among
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pleased the radical Republicans, and could have made matters im-
possibly difficult for him in his second administration.
Lincoln had a high regard for his often difficult custodian of the
Treasury," and played no little part in making Chase occupy, as the
President put it, "the largest place in the public mind in connection
with the office."12 In spite of the extreme pressure bearing on him
and his early expressed desire to appoint Chase, Lincoln waited to
make the appointment until the December term of the Court began.
While the President probably had little practical choice but to
appoint Chase, two large problems concerned him about Chase as
Chief Justice. First, Chase's appointment would irritate many who
were the enemies of the "radicalism" Chase reputedly embraced. A
Chief Justice with so many political enemies would bring a large
disadvantage with him to the court. More important, Chase had
been a perennial candidate for the Presidency, and he was still the
major aspirant of the radical wing of the Republican Party. "If he
does not give up that idea," Lincoln confided to George Boutwell,
"it will be very bad for him and very bad for me."13
How Chase reached the radical position which he supposedly held
at the time of his appointment illustrates the strengths and weaknesses
of this remarkably complex man. Chase earned the title of "Radical."
In spite of the hardships of a relatively impoverished early life, Salmon
Chase was a privileged person for his time and age. After finishing
Dartmouth College, he repaired to Washington, D.C., and there
gained entrance to the rarefied circles of the capital's society. He
studied law in the office of the Attorney General of the United States,
and was well on his way toward a most distinguished and lucrative
law practice in Cincinnati when he became immersed in the anti-
slavery cause. By 1837 he was well on his way toward earning the
epithet, "Attorney General for the Run-away Niggers," and subse-
quently he devoted much time to representing runaway slaves and
those who assisted runaways. He sacrificed his popularity and,
seemingly, the chance for an outstanding law practice, on what was
commonly thought a "vile business." 14 George Hoadly recalled that
those Lincoln promised that Chase would be the man were William Pitt Fessenden,
Charles Sumner, John Sherman and the entire Senate Committee on Finance.
11. As Shelby Cullom put it, "Lincoln entertained a very exalted opinion of
Chase's ability as a lawyer and as a man. He believed he possessed the qualifications
of a great Chief Justice." CuLLOm, op. cit. supra note 7, at 95.
12. II BouTwEL, R INiscENsEs OF SixTY Ym-,%s 29 (1902).
13. Id. at 29. Chase conveyed his assurances that the Presidential bug would die
with his ascension to the bench. The Presidential bug, of course, never dies. Lincoln
was still concerned about Chase's ambitions a few days before making the appoint-
ment, in spite of the assurances he received. As usual, Lincoln was quite correct in
his evaluation of Chase.
14. PIATr, MEMoWmS OF THE MEN WHO SAVED THE UNION 100 (1887). Piatt
[ VOr'. 18
CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE
"When I entered his office ... he was the most unpopular man in
Cincinnati." 5 As his one great cause was radical, so through associa-
tion with it, he became known as a radical.
He first burst into national prominence in 1849 as United States
Senator from Ohio, even though he was associated with a tiny radical
fringe group at the time. Of the handful of Anti-Slavery Freesoilers
in the lower house of the legislature, only two supported Chase. For
various reasons, ten seats were still dispdfted when the legislature
met. In a compromise move with party tensions high, the House was
organized to rule on the disputed seats. The two pro-Chase men
by voting together could control all votes taken. They voted on the
disputed seats so that an equal number were added to both political
parties, leaving these two men in control. As Chase wrote his wife
on the eve of his election, "I have no strength to spare, as none of
the Whig Freesoilers are in my favor."16 But nor could these Whig
Freesoilers when acting with the regular Whigs command a majority
in the House. After the smoke had cleared, it was apparent that some
"arrangement" had been made between Chase's friends and the
Democrats, because the organization of the House was favorable to
the Democrats, and they and Senate Democrats in turn voted to place
Chase in the Senate.'7 Needless to say, this maneuver did not strike
the Whigs favorably. This election originated a marked Whig anti-
pathy toward Chase, which was to be long remembered among those
who were Whigs in 1849.
As a Senator, together with a handful of other opponents of slavery,
he led the intransigent assault on Senator Stephen A. Douglas' Kansas-
Nebraska Act. Their action directly led to the formation of the
Anti-Nebraska movements throughout the North that culminated in
the Republican Party. Returning from the Senate as the best known
anti-Nebraska man in Ohio, he was elected to the first of two terms as
Governor in 1855. He was one of the few Republicans of prominence
to survive the party's unhappy electoral experiences in 1857, narrowly
winning re-election. When the Lincoln Administration was formed,
Chase departed his newly won Senate seat to assume the second
position in the cabinet, that of Secretary of the Treasury, in spite of
frantic opposition from former Whigs in the party. The leader of this
opposition within Lincoln's supporters was David Davis, by 1864
studied in Chase's Cincinnati law office, and records how he and his fellow students
could not understand their "great man's" preoccupation with such a "vile business."
15. HoADLEY, SAL ON P. CHAsE 4 (1887).
16. Letter to "My Dearest Wife," February 19, 1849, Library of Congress, Chase
MSS., Vol. 16.
17. The Election of Salmon P. Chase to the Senate, The Republic, March, 1875, pp.
179-85. Library of Congress, Chase MSS. Vols. 15-16, passim.
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Associate Justice Davis. Throughout, Chase was generally thought to
be a thorough-going radical due to his stout belief that Slavery must
be destroyed and his subordination of all other questions to that
end.'8 It is probable that his image, like that of Senator William
Seward of New York, who became Secretary of State under Lincoln,
was the major stumbling block to his presidential aspirations. By
1863, however, Chase was clearly identified as the leader of those
who favored a more vigorous and adventurous role in the war effort
on behalf of anti-slavery and Negro rights. As such, he entered the
Supreme Court both as a "radical" and as a leader of a major wing
of his political party, and as such, a prime candidate for the Presi-
dency, clearly identified with a highly partisan point of view.
More reflection on his political past might well have tempered the
enthusiasm of the telegrams that poured in upon his nomination, and
caused many of his partisans pause. For Salmon Chase had clearly
shown himself to be a one-issue radical, thoroughly devoted to that
one great issue, but not unmindful of other questions of public
importance.
Indeed, his preoccupation with slavery had led him down some
curious looking political paths. In 1840, he had supported a Whig,
William Henry Harrison. In 1844 he lent his efforts to the formation
of the Liberty Party, and in the following election he played a
primary role in creating the unusual combination of Free Soil
Democrats, Liberty Party men and Whigs who backed former Presi-
dent Martin Van Buren. Even though he made clear that the aim of
these and later activities was the sharp curtailment of slavery, this
aim had led him into variegated political involvements.
Two dominant factors, however, should have tempered any
simplistic evaluation of him as a "radical" in all things. First, he
worked with great skill and ingenuity to make the anti-slavery move-
ment more pragmatic and appealing to the concensus of the American
electorate. Much of his legal efforts were devoted toward the aim
of, as he put it before the United States Supreme Court, rescuing "the
Constitution from the undeserved opprobrium of lending its sanction
to the idea that there may be property in men."19 In much the same
way, by 1847 he was attempting to. capture one of the two political
parties for the anti-slavery cause. In 1847, after pointing out the
failures of the Liberty Party at the polls to John P. Hale, he concluded
that "the Liberty Party can never hope to accomplish anything as
18. Probably the sole exception was his belief that winning the war was a pre-
eminent necessity. Of course, anti-slavery was most intimately connected with this aim.
19. Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847). The material cited is from
Chase's voluminous written argument, and is reprinted in: Scrucmzns, SALMiON PonT-
LAND CusE 64-65 (1874).
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such, but can only [act effectively] through indirect action upon the
other parties."20 He proposed that a movement be formed which
would support anti-slavery candidates of the major parties, and thus
aspire to hold the balance between the parties, and thus accelerate
their movement toward anti-slavery positions. Where there were no
anti-slavery candidates, the movement would put third party candi-
dates in the races. The result was the 1848 Freesoil candidacy of
Martin Van Buren for President. This scheme involved, among other
things, a position on slavery which would both end in its demise and
be acceptable enough to the electorate to render an anti-slavery
position feasible for a major political party. This aim led him into
frequent conflict with more uncompromising abolitionists.
He developed a constitutional argument which he felt was both
sound and would serve his purpose. Essentially he maintained that
the United States Constitution was neutral on the subject of slavery,
neither sanctioning it nor prohibiting it. Thus, slavery became a state
matter in all respects. When a slave 'entered a free state from a
slave state, therefore, that slave became free, having left the jurisdic-
tion where slavery was in force through state law and entered into
a jurisdiction where slavery had no legal status. Needless to say, this
doctrine was convenient for one to maintain in a free state, but it
failed to satisfy many firm opponents of the peculiar institution. In the
first place, it affirmed the right of a state to maintain slavery if it
wished, but perhaps more important, his view denied the federal gov-
ernment any power over slavery within the states, either to protect it
or destroy it. In short, his position was limited to "urging abolition
only in the District of Columbia and in the territories, where it
existed without the support of state constitutions."21 This position
was grounded in an exaggerated notion of states rights, and was
bound to dissatisfy many more aggressive members of the anti-slavery
ranks. As Chase wrote to the eastern abolitionist and friend, Gerrit
Smith, in 1850:
I do not, as you are aware, coincide in your views as to the existing power
of Congress over the subject; nor as to the unconstitutionality of Slavery in
the States. In my view Slavery in the States is no more constitutional or
unconstitutional than slavery in Brazil. It is extra-constitutional in every
sense.22
In the process of bringing "to the idealistic program of the Liberty
20. Letter from SPC to John P. Hale, May 12, 1847, p. 3, New Hampshire
Historical Society, John P. Hale MSS.
21. HAriuow, GmruuTr Smxrm 165 (1939).
22. Letter From SPC to Gerrit Smith, May 3, 1850, Library of Congress, Chase
MSS., Second Series, Vol. I.
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Party a definitely pragmatic approach,"23 Chase strongly identified
the cause of the slave with advocacy of an extreme state's rights
position. As he made this identification over a long period of time, it
would be most unusual if he could shed this view with the triumph of
anti-slavery and his ascension to the Supreme Court. As we shall see,
he did not shed.
Together with a resolve to capture one of the two great parties
went a decision as to which one best lent itself to the role of prisoner.
Chase came to believe that by all odds the Democratic party offered
the Liberty men their best opportunity. He wrote the anti-slavery
Democratic leader of New Hampshire in 1847 that:
Many anti-slavery men look with most hope to the Whig Party. I do
not.... I fear that the Whig Party will always look upon the overthrow of
slavery as a work to be taken up or laid aside, like other measures, as
expediency may suggest. Whereas if we can once get the Democratic
Party in motion, regarding the overthrow of Slavery as a legitimate and
necessary result of its principles, I would have no apprehension at all of the
work being laid aside until accomplished.24
Indeed, many more diehard opponents of slavery felt that Chases's
intentions threatened the entire movement. As Lewis Tappan wrote
to the same New Hampshire leader: "Mr. Chase has never had the
entire confidence of the party.... He has shown too much desire
to merge the Liberty Party in portions of the other parties and to
accept of small advances from them."25 Mr. Chase had been too
moderate for abolitionist enthusiasts in the 1840's-and some felt he
would sacrifice the movement to satisfy personal advancement. The
circumstances of his election to the Senate scarcely diminished this
suspicion.
If Chase's attachment to the Democratic Party had only been one
of tactics for the profit of the anti-slavery movement, perhaps it would
reflect little of the man's political orientation. The fact was, however,
that Chase felt at home within the ranks of the Democratic party on
a wide range of issues. Aside from his State's rights orientation, he
was a fiscal conservative and hard money man of the Jacksonian
school. He summed up his position well in 1851.
[U]phold slavery as a local institution-all wrong in itself-but within state
limits beyond the control of the general government.... I think the signs of
23. Luthin, Salmon P. Chase's Political Career Before the Civil War, 29 MVHR 517
(1943).
24. Letter From SPC to Hale, May 12, 1847, p. 4, New Hampshire Historical Society,
John P. Hale MSS.
25. Letter From Lewis Tappan to John P. Hale, July 1, 1848, p. 10, New Hampshire
Historical Society, John P. Hale MSS.
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the times indicate the necessity of the organization of the Radical
Democracy. . . .We ought to welcome all Whigs who will join us, but
not modify or lower our Democratic platform to accommodate them. Our
motto should be no more slave states-no slave territory-no nationalized
slavery-retrenchment in expenditure-reform in administration-power to
the people and restriction upon the executive. 26
Even after the Republican Party was a going concern Chase lamented
that it had not kept some reference to the radical Democracy in its
name. Of course, most of his deviations toward moderation had
been forgotten in the party struggles which developed after the
middle of the 1850's and his defense of the administration's utilization
of extraordinary powers during the war. Nevertheless, it would have
been most remarkable had what David Donald called his "saving
quality of moderation" deserted him by 1864.27
It is doubtful if any man ever came to the Chief's chair with a
more thorough grounding in the political process. Chase's accomplish-
ments in practical politics were massive in the face of seemingly
impossible handicaps, and he had been a successful Secretary of the
Treasury under circumstances of unprecedented difficulty. His politi-
cal experience and connections were not, however, unmixed bless-
ings, for they posed some of his greatest difficulties, particularly when
it is recognized that his deepest interest in public life, the lot of
the Negro in American life, was not yet settled. Chase well recognized
the difficulties which this fact presented to him in maintaining a
posture of judicial neutrality. He also recognized that on the matter
of Negro rights, he could not be-and had no intention to be-politi-
cally neutral.
Some people seem dreadfully afraid that I shall lower the dignity of the
bench and damage my own by taking part in meetings for the promotion
of the welfare of such low creatures as "niggers" or for the advancement
of the cause of humanity and religion among men. I am sorry to disturb
their sensitiveness; but when I see an opportunity to do some good to black
or white I hope always to have courage enough to do it and let dignity take
care of itself.2
Thus, Chase defended an 1866 speech he made at Dartmouth in
which he blessed the Civil Rights' Act as "progress." Any Supreme
Court member who can defend this sort of public statement on the
ground that he "said nothing about its constitutionality or unconstitu-
26. Letter From SPC to "A newspaper editor," February 26, 1851, New York
Public Library, Misc. MSS., Salmon P. Chase.
27. RANDALL & DoNAm~, THE Cirv WAR AND RzcoNsT.ucroN 638 (1961).
28. Letter From SPC to Flamen Ball, April 10, 1866, p. 91, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase MSS., Letterbook.
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tionality, 29 has at least one unfortunate attitude toward his function
as a judge. He was open to the charge that he was dragging the
"judicial ermine through the dirt to propitiate radicals," 30 as former
President Buchanan maintained in 1867. Nor did his behavior while
Chief Justice do a great deal to mitigate partisan suspicions. On
Lincoln's second inauguration, he visited a cabinet meeting and
stayed a half-hour. He bombarded first Lincoln and then Andrew
Johnson with political advice on behalf of Negro rights and his ideas
on fiscal matters. He advocated Negro suffrage with a resolute and
wide-ranging fervor. And, until very early in 1868, he was hopeful
of being the Republican candidate for President. After his estrange-
ment from the party over Reconstruction policy and the impeachment
of Andrew Johnson, he was very nearly the Democratic candidate that
same year. When Chase took judicial stands which favored the
Democratic view of the Constitution, particularly after his 1868 break
with the radicals, his apparent willingness to support political mea-
sures made him vulnerable to the charge that he was still using the
Court for political advantage, though for different masters.
Since, the days of John Marshall, the Supreme Court has been a
meeting ground for strong personalities who often represent differing
points of view. They must endure each other under strenuous cir-
cumstances, and often the manner in which their personalities mix
must have been of no little importance in the development of our
public law. As presiding officer, the personality of the Chief Justice
can determine whether the everyday judicial social mixture is at
least bearable, or is a little bit of hell. He can have a great deal of
influence on the not inconsiderable style of the Court, beside de-
termining to a large extent whether or not the judicial mill grinds
smoothly. Chase's personality thus deserves attention.
His was a complex personality. Deeply and conscientiously religious,
he was openly vain beyond belief. His diary records so many visits
to his photographer that it almost seems he must have maintained an
office there. Not the least of his formidable characteristics was his
appearance, for he looked rather like a child's image of God. The
immigrant Carl Schurz upon first seeing him in the Senate declared
that "more than anyone else he looked the great man."3' 1 A Washing-
ton doctor prescribed "a look at the heavenly face of Senator Chase"
as the cure for those "who suppose the anti-slavery men wicked."32
Every Chief Justice finds it a part of his public role to act as the
29. Letter From SPC to C. D. Drake, April 24, 1866, p. 100, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase MSS., Letterbook.
30. XI ThE WoRms OF J~mis BucamNA 446 (Moore ed. 1911).
31. II ScHuz, RFzmvnscE~rSEs 170 (1908).
32. I ComvAY, AuTOBIOGRAPHY 185-86 (1904).
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physical personification of Justice. For this role, Chase obviously was
more than amply endowed. A massive composure engulfed the man,
so that even the ripe vegetables he sometimes caught full in the
face during the early days of his anti-slavery career could not dispel
the image of personal grandeur he presented.m It never hurts for a
Chief Justice to look like a Chief Justice.
His imposing presence served to prevent many people from ever
being friendly with him. Even Chase's young confidential secretary
during a latter part of his career recalled that he never felt free to
engage in small talk with so imposing a man. Once the ice was
broken, however, Chase proved to be most approachable. Virtually
every memory of the man recorded by contemporaries either notes
his personal warmth or his utter unapproachableness. Apparently,
many were not able to bring themselves to make the attempt to
become friendly with him, while those who did make the effort found
him a most congenial soul.
His letters reveal a subtle, probably overrefined sense of humor,
which can be seen through his reply to a man who wished to name his
son Salmon Portland Rhodes.
I had the misfortune to be born about a year after my uncle Salmon Chase
died at Portland; and to have a sort of memorial made of me by giving me
the name of Salmon Portland. My uncle was an excellent man and Portland
a very respectable city: but somehow I never liked the name derived from
them.... If you have due regard to the feelings of your boy, fifteen years
hence or twenty, I hardly think you will give it to him.34
Chase's impenetrable public dignity could carry over into personal
contacts. His overly refined sense of humor which helped make him
so extraordinarily attractive to women could be a hindrance in the
society of male Justices, many of whom came from the rough environ-
ment of the American frontier. He had what must have been an
irritating habit of acknowledging the superiority of his own judgment.
For example, in 1862 when an aide to General McClellan expressed
regret that Chase and the General had not been able to agree on war
policy, Chase replied that if McClellan had "acted in concert with me
... the rebellion would have been ended now."35 Of all the available
traits to choose from, at Chase's death his brethren on the bench
chose "pride of opinion" as his dominant characteristic.
33. Pr~v.TT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 100-01. Describes one of Chase's encounters
with some eggs.
34. Letter From SPC to J. C. Rhodes, December 29, 1863, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase MSS.




For all the pride in his make-up, if he was particularly devoted to
a project or policy he could work effectively with individuals whom
he disliked. Working out compromises on public issues about which
he felt strongly was, however, another matter. Nevertheless, he had
the knack of being able to fight most vigorously with individuals over
issues and yet still regard himself as being on friendly personal terms
with them. For all his hatred of slavery, he numbered numerous
slaveowners among his friends. Chase's voluminous correspondence
shows an amazing scarity of personal criticism of his enemies. He
could be rudely condescending, but even in the height of his cam-
paign to be rid of Lincoln as a presidential rival in 1864, he testified
to the honesty and character of the President, though he attributed
a great deal of irresolution and weakness to Lincoln.
As his letters and diaries testify, he worked amazingly long hours
in devotion to the always numerous tasks to which he set himself.
Perhaps this trait added to the conviction, shared even by those who
frankly hated him, that he was a man of tremendous personal ability
-a conviction shared by Abraham Lincoln.
As a lawyer, the appointee was rather suspect. He admittedly had
received legal training which was remarkably scant even for the early
19th century. Theoretically, he was trained under the watchful eye
of Attorney General William Wirt, but only once did Wirt even ask
him a question about his work. Had Chase not begged to be admitted
to the bar because he had already made arrangements to practice in
Ohio, it is unlikely that he would have been passed on his bar
examination.3" Setting up practice in Cincinnati, however, he seemed
well on his way to becoming a most prominent and successful attorney
when his interest in the anti-slavery cause distracted his energy. He
often had contributed to periodicals, and his monumental and highly
praised compilation of the laws of Ohio was a scholarly achievement
in his profession. Upon coming to the Supreme Bench, however, he
had not been active in the practice of law for almost fifteen years.
When appointed to the bench, Chase held no public office for the
first time in fifteen years.
His history shows him to be a man of great ability, capable of
bearing an immense burden of work. He was in general moderate
in his political outlook, but, he had been thoroughly devoted to
whatever measures were necessary in his judgment to the winning of
the war. Seldom did he come into contact with anyone who was
not impressed by his ability. Basically, he was a kind man in his feel-
ings for other people, but he could be a vain and domineering person,
quite used to getting his own way. Though his ability was recognized
36. Scacmmas, op. cit. supra note 19, at 29-30.
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by all and he could arouse individuals to vehement hostility. He
was ambitious and perhaps aware of his own ability to the point of
giving offense. In his career he had left many a bruised foe and some
injured friends behind who were never to forget the injuries. But,
he had shown a high degree of political acumen in attaining sought-
after policy goals, and had shown a willingness to work with others
toward those goals-and to work very hard.
Such was the man Lincoln placed at the head of the Supreme
Court during what were to prove to be some of the most turbulent
days of our history. His performance as Chief Justice can perhaps
be illustrated most clearly in two areas. First, an examination of his
Court's relationship with Congress during the Reconstruction period,
when, as Professors Kelly and Harbison tell us, "the modern concep-
tion of judicial review began to make its appearance.. . ."37 Secondly,
an evaluation of Chase's performance in the ultimate role of a Chief
Justice, as leader of the Court, should be attempted.
III. TiE COURT AND CONGRESS
The Supreme Court could just as easily have been the object
primarily ticketed for destruction by the famous 40th Congress of
1867-68 as was President Andrew Johnson. Not only was the Court's
influence probably at an all time low during the period from its ill-
fated 1857 decision in the Dred Scott case through the Civil War,38
but the Court was widely distrusted even by moderate Republicans.
So much so that in the spring of 1865, some prisoners were dispatched
to South Florida so that, in Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton's
words, "old Nelson or any other judge would not try to make difficulty
by habeas corpus."3 9
A brief glance at the personnel on the bench in 1865 quickly reveals
a major cause for such distrust. If ever a Court was eminently
qualified to get into such trouble, it would have been the Chase Court
.[rom 1865 to the beginning of the Grant administration. The
extraconstitutional attitude of Lincoln's wartime administration failed
to revert to "normalcy" in the even more confusing period of Recon-
struction. Congress went from a fairly conservative body in 1865 to
a point in 1868 where it was willing to try to impeach the President
from what its leaders frankly admitted were political motives. The
37. KELLY & I~inmsoN, THE AMmucA CoNsnlrxTo N 481 (1963).
38. This would seem to be a well-established conclusion. See, for example, the
contemporary comment of: Nation, Dec. 23, 1869 quoted in III WARREN, THE SUPREME
CourT iN UrraEn STATES HisTorY 228 (1923). Edward S. Corwin is also quoted by
Warren, Id. at 38-39. David Donald, probably the leading historian of the period
who has an interest in the Court's history, agrees. DoNALD, op. cit. supra note 35, at 4.
39. II THE DmARy OF GIDEON WELLES 334 (Beale ed. 1960).
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radical-dominated Congress which was willing to be rid of a President
for reasons of political expediency could scarcely be expected to treat
the Supreme Court with any more consideration. Especially con-
sidering the low esteem with which the Court was held, it would seem
that the Court would have been most susceptible to emasculation by
Congress during this period.
The personnel of the Court appeared tailor-made to court disaster.
Of the nine men effectively on the bench" three were holdover
appointees of pro-Southern Democratic Presidents before the war, and
a fourth was a Georgian, Justice James Wayne. He was an appointee
of Andrew Jackson who, though somewhat of a nationalist, was also
a strong States Rights Democrat. Although his son had fought in the
Confederate Army, Justice Wayne remained loyal during the war.
However, he could scarcely be expected to view with pleasure any
stern measures imposed upon his native South in peacetime. Robert C.
Grier of Pennsylvania was closely attached to the pro-Southern wing
of the Democratic Party and its pre-war leader, his friend and fellow
Pennsylvanian, former President James Buchanan. Though distinctly
a supporter of the Northern War effort, he manifested great impatience
with some war measures even while the conflict was in progress. To
expect such a man to extend his support of the war power of the
central government beyond the war was to expect too much. Even
during the war, Nathan Clifford of Maine and Samuel Nelson of
New York had actively opposed the Republican's conception of the
extent of the national government's legitimate area of power. Since a
radical-dominated Congress was bent on establishing federal military
rule in the defeated South, this four-man block with its narrow view
of the federal government's constitutional power represented a distinct
threat to Congress' Reconstruction plans. For example, every time a
southerner was held by the military authorities, he was the proper
subject for a habeas corpus petition which could reach the Supreme
Court, to name only the most probable way a case involving the
constitutionality of Reconstruction could reach Washington.
Although the five remaining members of the Court had been
appointed by President Lincoln, a close look at these men made the
odds for a head-on clash even heavier. Of course, only one desertion
from the five would be necessary to create a hostile majority of the
Court. Stephen J. Field of California, the last of the Associate Justices
appointed by Lincoln, was the most likely candidate. He was actually
a "War Democrat." He had joined the "Union Party" created to
entice Democrats to Lincoln's support in the 1864 election. Field
was to make no attempt to conceal his narrow view of the powers
40. The tenth, John Catron of Tennessee, was seriously ill and died in 1865.
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which he felt the Constitution allowed the national government in
peacetime. In addition, he was perhaps the last man alive to run from
a fight-any fight. He was abundantly deserving his reputation as a
headstrong product of frontier California, and it is doubtful that any
man ever sat on our Supreme Court who would more eagerly seize
the opportunity to enforce his will on his country.
David Davis of Illinois might never have become a Republican
had not Abraham Lincoln departed the defunct Whig Party for
Republican company. Lincoln was not only an idolized personal
friend, but Davis served him as his most trusted political lieutenant.
Much, and probably most, of his love in the party died with Lincoln.
Far from ever being in any sense "radical," Davis once wrote that
abolitionist leaders were "as corrupt and unprincipled... hypocrites
as ever disgraced the human family."41 He thought the Emancipation
Proclamation outrageous and urged Lincoln to rescind it. Once
shortly after the war he believed: "The people are mad now and, if
they don't recover soon, civil liberty will be entirely gone... Congress
claims omnipotent power like the British Constitution. Why then a
written Constitution? Majorities don't need any."42 He was, however,
basically a skilled politician, more than amply endowed with prudence.
Nevertheless, here was another potential enemy of the radical pro-
gram. Indeed, Davis was to bitterly leave the Republican Party over
the impeachment of President Johnson.
Of the eight Associate Justices only two could be considered "safe"
supporters of the radicals. Noah H. Swayne of Ohio had bitterly
departed his native Virginia out of hatred for slavery. His son,
General Wager Swayne, was an agent of the congressionally sponsored
Freedman's Bureau in Alabama. Swayne's carefully maintained politi-
cal connections were primarily with the radicals. The eighth Justice
was Samuel Miller of Iowa, one of the great judicial figures of our
history. He was certainly no less firm in his ties with the dominant
group in the Republican Party. Although his correspondence with his
brother-in-law reveals that his radical friends went beyond merely
straining his constitutional scruples, he proved to be safe.
In the popular eye, Chief Justice Chase was still regarded much as
the Richmond Examiner viewed him: as the "high priest of radical-
ism." With slavery now a thing of the past, he had whole-heartedly
turned his reformer's zeal to the cause of ensuring Negro suffrage
in the defeated South. With this aim in mind, he supported and
tried to give direction to radical Reconstruction well into 1867. Never-
theless, there was a time-bomb ticking away for the congressional
41. KiNG, LINCOLN'S MANAGEm, DAvm DAv s 51 (1961).
42. Id. at 257.
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radicals in this dominant figure. As already pointed out, Chase had
spent a good portion of his political life trying to convince the
Democratic Party that he was a good, conservative States Right
Democrat-except as to slavery and the political rights of Negroes. So
long as his great cause was unrealized and the "former" states of the
South were not in "their proper relationship" with the Union, the time
bomb only ticked. With his ample political experience and universally
recognized ability together with a personal presence to go with his
olympian position as leader of the Supreme Court, he could be a
formidable opponent. He recognized both the intensity of radical
purpose and the danger it could pose for his Court.
As a devoted partisan of the Negro with particular reference to
their right to vote, Chase had one excellent personal reason to keep
the judiciary out of Reconstructions path. As Chief Justice and
circuit judge43 for much of the South he was in a good position to
prevent troublesome causes from coming before the Court. And,
this he proceeded to prevent with great dedication. One might as
well have attempted to get him to expose himself to some dread,
infectious disease as accept jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition-
of course, in 1865-1868 the two bore striking similarities. He cautioned
southern federal district judges to stay out of the army's way as much
as possible.44 Also, he got the other Justice with southern circuit
responsibilities to agree not to attend circuit court in the South until
the legal status of the federal presence there was regularized by
Congress or the President.45 Besides his personal reasons for fostering
Reconstruction, he felt that otherwise, Supreme Court Justices would
be at the mercy of the military authorities. For, if they failed to
cooperate with the military, they would appear impotent, and if they
did cooperate, their courts would be in fact and in the public eye
"quasi-military courts." Neither alternative was attractive. Chase
snapped angrily at his friend Horace Greeley of the New York
Tribune that "The Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court
of the United States represent the highest Judicial Power of the
Nation, which cannot, with propriety or decency, be subordinated to
43. Under federal practice at the time it was customary for a Supreme Court Justice
to join with a federal district judge to constitute the intermediary appellate court in
the federal system. A district judge could hold circuit court by himself, however.
When McCardle came to the Court, it came via an 1867 statute allowing direct appeal
from the district court to the Supreme Court.
44. See, for example, his advice to North Carolina District Judge George W. Brooks.
"If I were you and if conflict with military powers should occur, I would submit for
the occasion . . . of course I should take care to avoid all unnecessary conflicts."
Letter From SPC to Brooks, March 20, 1866, Library of Congress, Chase MSS., Vol. 96.
45. Letter From James M. Wayne to SPC, May 30, 1867, Library of Congress,
Chase MSS., Vol. 98.
46. He wanted Chase to go into his circuit to preside at Jefferson Davis' treason trial.
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any military authority."47 Without a Supreme Court Justice present,
it was virtually impossible for a Southern case to get before the
Supreme Court through the federal judiciary.48 Chase also speedily
made himself an expert on that portion of the Judiciary Act governing
appeals from state courts.
When the Judicial Act of July 23, 1866 reduced the authorized
number of Justices to seven, Congress carelessly forgot to specifically
assign Justices to the altered judicial circuits. By at least August,
Chase noted that technically he had not been assigned circuit duties,
and in September began researching the matter.49 He soon became
convinced that he now had another excellent reason to avoid the
dangers awaiting him in his southern circuit. By October he had
carefully documented and reasoned out his position, and was ready
to ask his brethren for their views on the problem. His question
was followed by a detailed argument for his view of the situation.50
Not surprisingly, at least five of his colleagues agreed with him, and
the Chief Justice felt justified in staying from the troublesome South
until he was formally assigned the following March. He did not sit
in that part of his circuit which had been within the Confederacy
until the summer of 1867.
Plainly the Chief Justice wanted no cases before his Court likely
to lead to trouble with Congress. When trouble made its first appear-
ance, it came from outside the South.
In January 1867, opinions were released in three cases which im-
mediately sent the congressional radicals into an uproar. The most
famous of these is the classic habeas corpus case, Ex parte Milligan.51
Reputedly a disloyal civilian "Copperhead" in Indiana, Milligan had
been sentenced to death by a military tribunal. Although an 1863
act of Congress governing military arrests plainly voided the sen-
tence,52 Mr. Justice Davis' hatred of such "arbitrary" arrests led him to
47. Letter From SPC to Horace Greeley, June 1, 1866, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase MSS.
48. The major manner in which causes came from the circuit court to the Supreme
Court was through a "Certificate of Division." I.e., the circuit court was unable to
agree on the law in the particular case. It was understandably difficult for one judge
to disagree with himself.
49. Letter From District Judge Ballard (Kentucky) to SPC, August 16, 1866,
Library of Congress, Chase MSS., Vol. 97. Pennsylvania Historical Society, Chase
MSS., Diary, 1865-1868. Entry of September 15, 1866, p. 37.
50. Letter to All Justices, October 5, 1866, Pennsylvania Historical Society, Chase
MSS., Personal Papers, 1864-1872.
51. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
52. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, 77 Stat. 755. The authority for Milligan's arrest
came from the Presidential Proclamation of September 15, 1863, suspending the writ
of habeas corpus in certain areas. The proclamation was issued under the March Act
of Congress, which provided for the release of prisoners arrested as was Milligan, if the
next session of the grand jury did not return an indictment. None was returned against
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determine to rid the land of them forever. As Circuit Judge he made
certain that the case would come to the Supreme Court.53 Speaking
for the majority of himself, Nelson, Clifford, Grier, and Field, he
needlessly forbade Congress as well as the President from suspending
the writ outside of an actual theater of war. Speaking for the four
man minority Chase would have set aside the sentence on the basis
of the statute54 Thus Davis and company emphatically ruled against
the exercise of military authority over civilians outside of a war zone.
The South was no longer a war zone and Congress was preparing
legislation to set up military Reconstruction in the South.
The other two cases involved Missouri and United States statutes
requiring that a rigid "test oath" of loyal conduct during the war be
subscribed to before anyone could be licensed in certain professions-
an oath which few southerners could take. Justice Wayne took Davis'
place with the other four members of the Milligan majority to hold
both oaths unconstitutional. 55 Thus in all three cases either potential
or actual radical legislation was blasted out of the judicial sky by five
to four margins.
The way in which the Missouri test oath became a political fiasco in
judicial clothing points up this Court's political involvement. The
oath was included in the Missouri Constitution which was ratified in
June, 1866. The political campaign prior to the fall election began
late that spring and there was no more bitterly contested issue than
that between the pro-oath Republicans and the anti-oath Democrats.
The case had been before the Court early in the spring, but it was
announced on the last day of the term that the case was being con-
tinued.
The fun started when the eminent attorney-and eminent Democrat
-Reverdy Johnson informed conservative Congressman John Hogan
of Missouri that the Court had already voted to hold the oath uncon-
stitutional. Johnson's letter was made public, in Justice Miller's
alarmed words to Chase, "with fatal effect on the radicals." From
Iowa, Miller urged Chase to get a correction to some "radicals of
reputable standing," since "while we may well feel restrained from
... stating what did take place, there is nothing wrong, but a manifest
propriety in contradicting the assertion." Miller would have been glad
to supply the corrective himself, but unfortunately no one had asked
him. Rather odd, that with all his political friends next door in
Milligan. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 22-84. DONALD, op. cit. supra note 35, at 196. I THE
Drmy OF GmEoN WEL.E s 433-34 (Beale ed. 1960).
53. KnHe, op. cit. supra note 41, at 250.
54. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 132 (1866) (dissenting opinion).
55. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
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Missouri, Miller did not think of sending one of them the "confidential
communication" that he urged Chase to write from far-off Washing-
ton.56
It seemed even more odd when Chase played Alphonse to Miller's
Gaston. The Chief Justice likewise demurred from sending the cor-
rection. At first, he stoutly refused to condone such a move, as it
would be considered "mere partisanship."57 But upon further thought,
he suggested to Miller: "If you think it wise... write to Swayne and
Davis" and suggest that they spread the glad tidings to the faithful
in Missouri.58
Somehow the news got to the faithful, but there was nothing odd
in neither Chase nor Miller wanting to go on record as denying what
Johnson revealed. While it was technically true that no vote had
been taken on the merits of the case, both men knew that a vote
which would have struck down the Missouri statute had been nar-
rowly headed off at the final conference of the term. Note that
Chase can correctly identify in Swayne and Davis the other members
of the minority-to-be, and in addition Miller was able to correctly
identify the division on the Court in a letter in July.59
What happened was that the Court was anticipating that a vote
on the merits would be taken at the final conference held on the
morning of the last day of the term, and that the decision would be
announced without opinion at the final public session. Justice Grier
so informed Orville Browning on March 25, correctly identifying
which Justice was on which side. When no decision was forthcoming,
Justice Nelson explained to Browning "that the postponement was
by Grier's vote." Later, Field told Browning that at the last confer-
ence "Miller made a personal appeal to have the test oath ... post-
poned till next term, and that Grier in the kindness of his heart
consented."60 Chase's letter to Miller on June 9 apparently confirms
that considerable maneuvering went on that last day of the term, for
Nelson tried to get something changed later in the day, and was
stopped only by Clifford's refusal to "have anything to do with
disturbing what was already decided."
The Court had plainly chosen sides in a vicious political battle.
And both sides did their part to place the Court in the middle of
the unpleasantries. Both the motives of Miller and company, on the
56. Letter From Samuel Miller to SPC, June 5, 1866, Library of Congress, Chase
MSS., Vol. 97.
57. Letter From SPC to Miller, June 9, 1866, p. 225, Pennsylvania Historical Society,
Chase MSS., Letterbook.
58. Letter From SPC to Miller, June 15, 1866, p. 234, fEmphasis added.) Pennsyl-
vania Historical Society, Chase MSS., Letterbook.
59. FAmmrA, MR. Jusncn. Mni.na AN = SupRmd CoURT 130-31 (1939).
60. II THE Dmny oF ORnVLu I-hcmrN BROwVNWG 686 (Pease & Randall eds. 1931).
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one hand, and Field and Nelson on the other were far too political
for safety's sake, not to mention some other obvious reasons.
The congressional majority was somewhat more than peeved with
the Court. Although there had been a healthy Republican radical
majority in the 39th Congress, after the battle between Congress and
President burst into high gear, the fall elections of 1866 had trans-
formed this majority into one of overwhelming size. The import of
these three cases could scarcely have escaped the radicals-or anybody
else. It denoted an intention to invalidate the Reconstruction laws
even then being drafted. Whatever else may be said about the 40th
Congress, its majority did not suffer from timidity, and was unlikely
to let a mere bagatelle-like respect for the Supreme Court as an institu-
tion stand in its way. Their response was immediate, angry and
pointed. For example, influential Ohio Congressman John Bingham
proposed legislation which would have virtually stripped the Court of
its appellate jurisdiction. Even Justice Field was struck by the
viciousness of the assault.
Exactly what happened within the Court between January and
April of 1867 we can never know, but certainly it transformed its
stance from one of belligerant assertiveness to one of retiring pru-
dence. In April the Court unanimously refrained from accepting
jurisdiction over a motion in equity seeking to restrain President
Johnson from administering the March Reconstruction Acts.61 Speak-
ing through Chase, the Justices unanimously maintained that the
bill asked the Court to prevent the President from performing an
essentially "executive and political" duty. Chase pointed out that
such a Presidential power was beyond the constitutional reach of the
Court. Two other slightly altered attempts met a similar fate on
different grounds, with opinions to follow in the next tenn.62 As the
Court adjourned until the following December, Chase must have
breathed a relieved sigh when he privately described the decisions
as being "as sound in law as beneficial." 63
This tactical retreat was probably not solely determined by an
ironclad view of the law in the case, as shown by the Court's later
actions. The sudden air of self-restraint might have partly come from
the close personal relationship Chase had developed with the two
leading intransigents on the bench, Nelson and Clifford. Mr. justice
Field had for some time gone out of his way to ingratiate himself
with Chase, and perhaps he was drawn toward prudence by Chase's
capitalizing on Field's desire to please his Chief. The deep respect
61. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
62. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).




Miller enjoyed with all his brethren probably made its mark, and
certainly Congress made the dangers of the situation clear in a most
blunt manner.
By the time the Court reconvened several changes had either taken
place or were in the making. 4 Not the least of which was the fact
that the Chief Justice had already begun his departure from the
radicals' constitutional ship-or from his point of view, the radicals
had sailed away from the moorings of the Constitution. By the sum-
mer of 1867, it is apparent that the Republican Congress was going
further than Chase was willing to go with them. If one were forced
to name the date when he realized that he was no longer in complete
agreement with the Reconstruction course Congress was pursuing,
the time would probably be the night of July 8, 1867. Congress had
hurriedly convened to enact legislation to counteract Attorney General
Stanberry's interpretation of the March Reconstruction Acts, an inter-
pretation which bad been most lenient to the South. On the 19th,
a bill was enacted which in effect tried to place the military com-
manders beyond the control of the President.
On July 8, Chase wrote a letter to one of his favorite newspaper
friends, Theodore Tilton. The next day, he edited the previous effort
and came to a very different result. In both letters he expressed
the hope that Congress would not basically change its Reconstruction
policy. In the first letter, however, he suggested additional measures,
which, although milder than what Congress did enact, were along
the lines eventually followed. He advised that:
[T]he Military Commanders should be . . . authorized to remove officers
. . . of the provisional Governments, who wilfully obstruct . . . the acts,
and provide for the filling of the vacancies by election with universal suff-
rage, or by appointment... affirmed by the Military commander.65
The second letter made no such recommendation. Rather he expressed
doubts as to the efficacy of additional stringencies.
I shall be sorry if [Congress] attempt[s] to supercede the President as
the Commander of the army, or to make the District Generals Superior to
all civil authority as well as all military. For I do not think it is necessary
to the great ends for which the country longs-restoration as the basis of
justice and equal rights, firmly secured by the Constitution and laws.66
64. Mr. Justice Wayne died in 1867, leaving the Court's membership at eight.
Congress had previously reduced the authorized number of Justices to seven in order
to prevent Johnson from making any appointments, so Wayne was not replaced.
After the election of Grant, the permanent membership of the Court was again placed
at nine, where it has remained ever since.
65. Letter From SPC to Theodore Tilton, July 8, 1867, pp. 211-14 (not sent),
Library of Congress, Chase MSS., Letterbook I.
66. Letter From SPC to Theodore Tilton, July 9, 1867, pp. 221-23 (sent), Library
of Congress, Chase MSS., Letterbook I.
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With the exception of this significant change, the letters are identical.
What Chase wanted out of Reconstruction remained constant. On
July 11, he wrote his youngest daughter that "[i]t is to be hoped...
that the amendments will be so formed as to insure the earliest possi-
ble reorganization, under Constitutions securing to all equal rights and
equal security for rights."67 It was during this special session of
Congress that we have the first positive evidence that he believed
the Republican majority was not working wisely towards those ends,
and not working by means he could bring himself to approve. By
January, 1868, he was expressing his opinions caustically to Horace
Greeley, and finding the motive for the harsh Reconstruction policies
of "a majority" of the Republicans in their fondness for "whatever
seems most harsh on the rebels," not on any genuine concern for
human rights.0 Chase wanted fair treatment and suffrage for the
Negro, but he otherwise favored a more lenient policy toward the
South. An attempt to remove the military commanders in the South
from Presidential control was a step Chase could not condone, al-
though at the time his position was apparently thought a minor
deviation and was apparently scarcely noticed.
The impasse between the President and Congress had deepened,
and the President's determination to avoid complying with the Tenure
of Office Act, which required Senatorial approval before a cabinet
member could be removed, was pushing inevitably toward the clash
which would give Thad Stevens and the extreme radicals in the
House the opportunity to pass their bill of impeachment.
Worse yet, the lawyers for a Mississippi newspaperman named
William McCardle noticed than an 1867 habeas corpus statute69 de-
signed to protect pro-Reconstruction individuals in the South from
State officials would also apply to their militarily imprisoned client.
Courtesy of a Reconstruction statute, therefore, Ex Parte McCardle °
ironically went winging its way to the Supreme Court, directly bring-
ing the backbone of Reconstruction before the Court.
On into February, 1868, however, the Court appeared to be sailing
on a relatively calm sea. The Court's opinion covering the last two
reconstruction cases of the previous spring was at long last released
in early February, and "old Nelson," himself of all people, was its
author.71 In light of this decision few at the time thought the Court
would accept jurisdiction over the McCardle case.72
67. Letter From SPC to Nettie, July 11, 1867, Ibid., Vol. 99.
68. Letter From SPC to Horace Greeley, January 17, 1868, New York Public Library,
Horace Greeley MSS.
69. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385.
70. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868).
71. Georgia v. Stanton, op. cit. supra note 62.
72. Both the Democratic New York Herald ("The Court is out of this reconstruction
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There was a problem, however. The 1867 habeas corpus statute all
too plainly covered McCardle. On February 18 the Court unani-
mously agreed to hear the case on its merits with Chase himself
writing the opinion, noting that "This legislation is of the most
comprehensive character.... It is impossible to widen this jurisdic-
tion."73 While the case was being argued, the storm of impeachment
broke over Johnson's refusal to abide by the Tenure of Office Act.
On February 24, the President was impeached, with Chase as Chief
Justice specifically required by the Constitution to preside at his trial
before the Senate. From the time of the first communications of
the Senate with the Chief Justice it became obvious that a "cruel"
blow was being dealt the radicals. Their one-time darling; the original
radical himself; that "d... d Abolitionist" from Ohio not only insisted
in conducting the trial in a non-partisan, judicial manner, but
privately-and in a none too well-concealed manner-he bitterly op-
posed the attempt to remove the President. "To me," he wrote his
old abolitionist friend, Gerrit Smith, "the whole business seems
wrong."7 4 The radicals' "reliable" Chief Justice irreyocably departed
their ship.
All things considered, the radicals had ample grounds to believe
the Court was going to declare a significant portion of their Recon-
struction handiwork unconstitutional. And they were right.
Had the merits of the McCardle case been reached, the decision
would have been in his favor. Chase so advised Mississippi District
Judge Robert A. Hill, and Justice Field later told Orville Browning
the same thing.75 If Field was correct, even Justice Miller was pre-
pared to go along, leaving only Swayne in dissent. But plainly the
Court had no wish to place its own head beside Johnson's on the
chopping block in that wild spring of 1868, when the very nature
of the Presidency was openly challenged by a congressional majority
intoxicated with its own program and power. Chase wanted to post-
pone a decision in McCardle on the grounds that he could not
guarantee his presence due to his duties presiding over the Senate.76
fight") and the Republican New York Times ("It is believed that a similar decision
awaits the McCardle case.") thought so. Once the implications of Nelson's opinion were
absorbed, however, the Times became convinced it was "likely" that the Court was
prepared to deal harshly with the Reconstruction Acts. The decision to hear the merits
in McCARDLE was therefore viewed by Congress as a direct threat. N.Y. Times, Feb.
15, 1868, p. 4, Col. 3; N.Y. Herald, Feb. 12, 1868, p. 4.
73. Ex parte McCardle, supra note 70, at 326.
74. Letter From SPC to Gerrit Smith, April 19, 1868, Library of Congress, Chase
MSS., Second Series, Vol. 3.
75. Letter From SPC to Robert A. Hill, May 1, 1868, p. 654, Library of Congress,
Chase MSS., Letter Book. II Ti DraRY OF ORvILLE HicKMsA BRoWNING 191-92.
76. Letter From SPC to John Van Buren, April 5, 1868, p. 199, Pennsylvania Histori-
cal Society, Chase MSS., Letterbook.
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Such a pretext for delay was too thin for his colleagues to act on.
Help was on the way, however. For Congress had not the slightest
desire to have the highest court in the land officially inform the nation
that its basic legislation was unconstitutional. After hearing the
McCardle jurisdiction decision, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois
went directly to the Senate from the courtroom to introduce a bill
repealing the statute on which McCardle's appeal was solely based. 7
It passed but was met with a Presidential veto. The case was reached
in its regular tun for a decision in conference before the veto message
reached Congress, but in the words of Chase and several of the
Associate Justices, the Court thought it undignified to "run a race
with Congress." So, they consciously waited for relief from the
necessity of making a decision. As expected, they were relieved when
Congress overrode Johnson's veto. Now, at any rate, argument had
to be held on the question of whether Congress could deprive the
Court of jurisdiction in a case already argued. After some futile
attempts to have such an argument, the Court rather hastily adjourned
until the following December.78 An opinion by Chase early that
term maintained that Congress could so deprive the Court of juris-
diction.79 Thus the Court's strategic retreat was complete.
The instinct of group-or self-preservation had won. Two mem-
bers of the Court did share in the madness of Washington, however.
Grier and Field objected. They objected through Grier in one of
the most insulting, aspersion-casting opinions a minority ever aimed
at a majority of the Court. "By the postponement of this case, we
shall subject ourselves, whether justly or unjustly, to the imputation
that we have evaded the performance of a duty imposed on us by
the Constitution... ." And for anyone willing to translate a quotation
from the Roman poet Ovid, Grier and Field affirmed that in their eyes
this imputation was all too true. "It fills me with shame that these
reproaches can be uttered, and cannot be repelled."80
Opponents of the radicals were indeed most disappointed. Orville
Browning, for example, bitterly recorded some untypically harsh
words in his diary after learning that the Court would have decided
77. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1868, p. 4, col. 1.
78. III WAmma, op. cit. supra note 38, at 196-203. Letter From SPC to John Van
Buren, April 5, 1868, p. 199, Pennsylvania Historical Society, Chase MSS, Letterbook.
N.Y. Times, May 1, 1868, p. 4. The latter conveyed the impression to this reader
that the Court acted to discourage argument at that term.
79. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
80. F=rD, BPmn-ascENcns oF EAmXY DAYs iN CALIFORNIA 209-10 (1893). The
translation is the one given here by Field. The Springfield Republican reported that
the dissent caught the other members of the Court by surprise. III WA.umEr, op. cit.
supra note 38, at 205.
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for McCardle had the merits been reached. "This exhibition of
cowardice on the part of the Court, and their readiness to surrender
the inalienable rights of the citizen to the usurpation and tyranny
of Congress is among the alarming symptoms of the times." 8'
The number of people in Washington who kept their wits about
them in the spring of 1868 was certainly not large. For three people
who had been so acutely aware of the dangers of the Court's situation
as were Chase, Miller, and Davis, the discretion of taking the out
offered by Congress is most understandable. It is most interesting
to note, however, that the two oldest incorrigibles, who were willing
to risk congressional and executive retaliation during the war, were
on the side of prudence this time. Why Nelson and Clifford did not
join Grier and Field can never be known; but it is certainly a most
interesting question, especially since Nelson had virtually offered
an invitation for a challenge to Reconstruction through equity pro-
ceedings in his opinion in Georgia v. Stanton on February 10.8 What-
ever the reason, Clifford and Nelson together with their four
colleagues deserve to be ranked among the sane in the insane spring
of 1868. Since the beginning of the Court's history, it has striven
with considerable consistency to take into account outside reper-
cussions in choosing the time to hand down decisions. Much of its
difficulties in controversial decisions has come from errors in timing,
and if ever there was a time when the Court could have expected
repercussions of the most damaging nature, it was in the spring of
1868. The Court did run away from a fight, but in running, it
could always turn around when those chasing lost interest.
When Chase gave the Court's full opinion confessing that it no
longer had jurisdiction over the McCardle case, he specifically re-
minded anyone who might be interested that the Court retained all
its habeas corpus jurisdiction under the Act of 1790.83 Somebody
named Edward M. Yerger was most interested.
Yerger applied for the writ in 1869 while being held by the mill-
81. II TBE DIAny OF ORVILLE HicxmAN BROwNING 191 (entry of April 9, 1868).
82. Supra note 62. The opinion held that the Court lacked jurisdiction. Nelson
pointed out that the Court could "grant relief so far only as the rights of persons or
property are drawn into question, and have been infringed." Three times he repeated
that if a case concerned rights "of persons or property, not merely political rights,"
the jurisdiction might not be withheld. He pointed out the petition's deficiency in this
regard. Although property was mentioned, "it is neither stated as an independent
ground, nor is it noticed at all in the prayers for relief. . . . Such relief would have
called for a very different bill from the one before us." Chase concurred only in the
result It is worth noting that the preceding May he thought that the opinion would
be "sound in law," but apparently recognized the dangers in Nelson's opinion when it
finally came down. He must have been urging caution on the stubborn New Yorker
earlier in the 1868 term.
83. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869).
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tary authorities in Mississippi. In Willard Kings's words, "Grant's
inauguration brought some relief from radical excesses."8 Actually,
the fever pitch of radicalism began passing immediately after the
failure to convict Johnson, which coincided with the nomination of
Grant in May of 1868.85 The timing element was much more pro-
pitious for the Court in 1869.
Yerger's attorneys first attempted to get the District Judge, Robert
A. Hill, to accept his petition, but Hill merely took the matter under
advisement. Next they tried Justice Swayne; but Swayne was not
the circuit judge for Mississippi, and it was still an open question
whether or not a Justice had jurisdiction to entertain such a petition
outside his circuit. Chase had been turning down such petitions with
great devotion on this ground since the war, but it was possible that
a recent statute could be interpreted as granting jurisdiction outside
one's own circuit. Swayne decided to let his Chief handle the matter,
and sent the attorneys to take their application to Chase, to have it
"granted or denied according to [his] views of the law." At this
convenient juncture, Chase concluded that the time had come to
decide such a vexing jurisdictional question. He wrote Nelson and
Clifford, asking their views. He noted, however, that "under the
circumstances I have no doubt of my duty, if I have the power.
'" 86
To make certain the petition would be accepted, Chase also wrote
a most leading letter to Judge Hill. Hill's authority to entertain
the petition as district judge, Chase reminded him, "cannot be ques-
tioned." Swayne and Chase's could be, and considering that Yerger
would have to be surrendered by the military subject to orders from
Washington, care obviously must be taken to be above suspicion.
Hill was told he had but two alternatives: He could entertain the
writ, or he could kick the question upstairs to the Supreme Court.
"[Y]our duty," Chase informed Hill none too subtly, "is a necessary
inference from your authority."87 In short, the Chief Justice told a
District Judge that he had to act.
The following day, Chase learned the happy news that Swayne
had decided to accept the writ. Further, as Chase wrote Clifford
with obvious relief, "the discharge of the prisoner was approved
under the direction of the War Department, and the jurisdiction was
not questioned... ."8 Only Miller questioned the jurisdiction when
84. KING, op. cit. supra note 41, at 272.
85. McKrrncr, op cit. supra note 1, at 506-08.
86. Letter From SPC to Nathan Clifford, June 22, 1869, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase Papers.
87. Letter From SPC to Robert A. Hill, June 22, 1869, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase Papers.




Chase wrote the opinion on appeal to the Supreme Court, and he
did so without opinion.89 In this correspondence, one can almost
hear the judicial axe being honed for the benefit of military Recon-
struction,90 as Mississippi was one of the three states not yet re-
admitted to representation in Congress.
Senator Lyman Trumbull responded on cue in the Senate with a
bill which flatly forbade judicial review of congressional Reconstruc-
tion. Four days later on December 13, Senator Drake of Missouri
took the next logical step, and in effect proposed an end to judicial
review, period. To judge from the newspaper accounts, there was
not a great deal of support for these measures. It made no difference.
Yerger's counsel and the Attorney General agreed to take no further
action in the case, and to turn Yerger over to the state authorities
when Mississippi was readmitted early in 1870.91 With the other
states bordering on admission, Reconstruction became a dead issue
before the Court.
From Milligan to McCardle, the Court performed like an expert, if
aged, escape artist. It asserted its authority up to the danger point
and then retreated, always just avoiding accepting the invitation to
court disaster. Awareness of the dangers was indeed forced upon the
Court by Congress' explosive manifestations. But awareness of
danger is never necessarily synonymous with caution, and it was
certainly not generally synonymous in Washington in 1867 and 1868.
The long-time awareness of the danger which Chase and Miller
shared, their experience in politics within the Republican ranks, and
their influence within the Court indicate that these two probably
deserve the main credit for steering their brethren away from the
hemlock cup. In light of Chase's habit of closely conferring with
Nelson and Clifford, it may well be that he exercised a considerable
moderating influence on these two long-time foes of the Republicans.
Such an attitude of self-restraint was typical judicial behavior for
Miller. It was most atypical for Chase. Once the political tempera-
ture shot downward, Chase was free to behave typically-and so
was the Court.
This group of Justices demonstrated over and over again that they
were scarcely timid about their power. They had been under restraint
89. On October 25, 1869; Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
90. For example, just before the 1868 election, Justice Davis-no political noviciate-
frankly feared that Congress might be intent on "destroying the Supreme Court."
Nevertheless, he advised Justice Clifford that "for us there is but one course to pursue.
Do our duty-leaving the consequences which we cannot control to God." When the
heat proved to be less intense than expected, he was no doubt even more inclined to
leave "the consequences . . . to God." Letter From David Davis to Nathan Clifford,
November 2, 1868, Nathan Clifford Mss., Maine Historical Society.
91. WAnmuN, op. cit. supra note 38, at 213-19.
1965 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
from outside pressures since Chase became their Chief. When this
restraining wrap began to slip off in 1868, one might logically expect
them to become self-assertive. With the Chief Justice leading the
way, this is exactly what they became.
Before 1865, only two acts of Congress had ever been declared
unconstitutional. By the time Chase died, the total was twelve, seven
of them between 1869 and 1873. Besides the congressional Test
Oath Case, Ex Parte Garland, two innocuous statutes were invalidated
prior to 1869. One of these, Gordon v. United States92 had to be
overruled by implication in United States v. Klein,93 in order to reach
a conclusion which would invalidate the act of 1870 designed by
Congress to reverse the Court's lenient interpretation of the confisca-
tion acts. By far the most spectacular of the cases invalidating
congressional legislation was Hepburn v. Griswold,9 4 in which Chase
wrote the opinion declaring unconstitutional at least in part the
Legal Tender Act which he supported as Secretary of the Treasury.
Within fifteen months Hepburn was reversed, and the act declared
constitutional in toto.95 The unprecedented speed of this reversal
was in itself a daring bit of judicial audacity.
In The Alicia,96 an 1864 act of Congress granting immediate appeals
in prize cases from the district court to the Supreme Court was
struck down as awarding jurisdiction to the Court not warranted by
the Constitution. In March, 1870, a portion of the Habeas Corpus
Act of March 3, 1863, was struck down. In the famous case of
Collector v. Day,98 the Court's state's rights bias, which Chase shared,
was showing when a tax on the salaries of state judges was held
unconstitutional as a tax on a necessary instrumentality of the state
governments; and, hence, a violation of the reserved rights of the
states. A section of the Internal Revenue Act of 1864 disappeared
92. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865). The other was Reichert v. Felps, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 160 (1868).
93. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
94. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
95. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). There was one vacancy on the
Court that decided Hepburn, and Justice Grier retired effective six days before the
decision was announced on February 7, 1870. The matter had become a straight
party issue with Democrats opposing the act's constitutionality, and Republican's
favoring it. President Grant appointed two new Justices the same day that Hepburn
was announced. William Strong of Pennsylvania and Joseph P. Bradley of New Jersey,
changing the five men majority to a four man minority. I would like to note with
thanks the information and insights on Legal Tender and numerous other matters
during this period of the Court's history which Professor Harold Hollingsworth of
Arlington State College has so generously shared with me.
96. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 571 (1869).
97. Justices of the Supreme Court of New York v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274
(1870).
98. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
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under the Court's edict in 1873.99 Together with Garland, Gordon
v. United States, United States v. Klein, Hepburn, and United States
v. DeWitt in 1870, a total of ten acts of Congress fell before the
Court during Chase's eight and one-half years on the bench. Milligan
should probably be considered on the list, since five members of the
Court in effect limited congressional power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and wiped out any authority to permit military trials
of civilians outside of the zone of actual warfare. No succeeding
decade of Court history would see more than five acts of Congress
declared unconstitutional until 1904-1913.00 Acts of Congress were
far more vulnerable to the judicial axe in 1869-1873 than at any time
in the previous history of the Court.
It should be noted that only four of the eleven cases attacked what
was strictly speaking war legislation. The Court's aggressive ten-
dencies apparently went beyond an assault on "extraordinary" war-
time legislation.1 1
In the light of the job later done by the Court on legislation regu-
lating property, it is interesting to note that in United States v.
DeWitt in 1871, for the first time an act of Congress regulating the
sale of goods was declared unconstitutional. The Revenue Act of
1867 had made the selling of oil for illuminating purposes illegal
if it was inflammable at a temperature lower than 110 degrees.
Speaking through Chase, the Court unanimously struck down this
attempted regulation by turning Taney's "police power" doctrine
around and using it to deny Congress the right to interfere with the
police power of the states. The regulation was "too remote" from
the taxing power to be sustainable, and Chase felt the commerce
power was too thin a reed to lean upon.
But this express grant of power to regulate commerce among the States
has always been understood as limited by its terms; and as a virtual denial
of any power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the
separate states .... This has been so frequently declared by this court,
results so obviously from the terms of the Constitution, and has been so
fully explained and supported on former occasions, that we think it unneces-
sary to enter again upon the discussion.102
The "former occasions" were the License Cases and Passenger Cases'°3
in which the police power had been tested against the federal com-
merce power to determine the validity of a state's exercise of the
99. United States v. B. & 0. R.R., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1873).
100. HAInS, THE AwnmucAN DOcTRNE OF JumcmL SuPRnmcy app. I (1928).
101. Ex parte Garland, supra note 92; Hepburn v. Griswold, supra note 94; Ex parte
Milligan, supra note 51; United States v. Klein, supra note 93.
102. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 43-45 (1869).
103. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1846); 48 U.S. (7 How.) 293 (1948).
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police power. In 1867, the Court for the first time invoked the other
side of "dual federalism" and struck down federal legislation as in-
fringing on a state's right. The states rights emphasis which Chase
shared with his Court struck at a federal power, and at the same
time prevented a regulation of property rights.
The evidence shows that both Chase and the Court were more than
politically aware-they were politically involved. The Court's general
lack of sympathy with Congress during the Reconstruction period
was manifest. But, as the Court was involved, so was it aware. With
awareness came a saving prudence. In 1866 and again in early 1868,
the Court acted aggressively, only to retire from the field of battle
each time before Congress had been goaded into doing real harm.
This prudence contributed immeasurably to the Court's renewed
prestige and esteem after 1869. A prestige which would assist the
Court in largely vitiating the effect of the Civil War amendments,
and later so strongly to defend property rights. Considering the
heated political times of the 1860's, it is perhaps most fortunate
that such a politically oriented Court sat during these years. Had
the Court followed the "simple" 1 4 route of merely laying the Con-
stitution as they understood it beside Reconstruction legislation, the
nation's political health would have been put to an even more grievous
strain, and the Court's institutional health would probably have be-
come as marginal as that of the Presidency.
Underneath this prudence was the willfulness which over and
over again took the Court to the brink from which it had the good
sense not to leap. Once the jump became less dangerous, this
Court was most willing to take the first concerted leap into what
has been called "Judicial Supremacy."
In all of this, the Chief Justice loomed most significant. While
we can never know the exact influence he exercised in discussing
matters in Court conferences, there is much evidence to indicate
that he played a considerable role in determining the Court's actions.
The tenor of the Court's performance followed his own preferences
to a high degree. Although with the minority in the Test Oath Cases
and Milligan, his strong sympathies with the plight of the South
are reflected in the confiscation cases as well as in his private cor-
respondence. In general, the Court's policy during the dangerous
days of Reconstruction followed his views. Once the Court began,
strongly to assert itself, it was doubtless following a course which
104. In his reminiscenses, Field stated his views with stark simplicity. "Many things,
indeed, were done during the war, and more after its close, which could not be
sustained by any just construction of the limitations of the constitution. . . . [T] here
was but one course to pursue, and that was to apply the law and the constitution .... "
FmrLD, op. cit. supra note 59, at 191. One rather doubts it was all that simple.
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Chase encouraged. Since the available evidence indicates that Chase
was a formidable advocate in conference, 05 apparently a large share
of the praise and blame for what the Court did in these years must
rest on his shoulders. An examination of how Chase handled his task
as Chief Justice within the Court is thus in order.
IV. CHAsE As JuDIcL&L LEADER
The Chief Justice of our court while held responsible by the public for
all its acts has but little influence over these acts by reason of the position
and it is only when the character, or rather quali[fications?] of the Chief
justice are such [as?] would give him a controlling influence without the
position, that he can exercise that which is justly his'due.1°6
-Mr. Justice Samuel Miller
As Justice Miller pointed out, the Chief Justice's leadership on
and responsibility for the actions of the Supreme Court is perhaps
too freely acknowledged by the public at large. Within the Court,
the Chief must fight to establish himself as leader.
As already indicated, Chase encountered several obstacles to any
assumption of leadership within the Court. The lamentable public
reputation of the Court was itself a handicap. In a large part of the
public mind, he was to reform what an Iowa newspaper called "that
fossilized circle of venerable antiquities which constitutes the Bench
of the Supreme Court of the United States." 107 Chase was appointed
at least in part for that purpose and everyone expected he would
actively try to bring the Court to an advanced, and perhaps radical,
position on the issues of the day. Such an anticipation could only
make his task more difficult in initially dealing with the members
of the Court, especially those with an ardent determination not to be
reformed by this professional reformer.
Aside from the difficulties to which reputation and public expecta-
tion exposed Chase, the Court as a whole was by no means an easy
one to deal with. In the first place, it was a badly split Court on
public issues. And, of course, it was in this more exposed, political
105. For an extreme example, Justice Miller was the able and strong-willed leader
of the five man majority attempting to get a reversal of Hepburn. Chase led the new
minority and pulled out all the stops to prevent a case getting on the docket which
would enable Miller and company to get their reversal. With only a minority to back
him, Chase put up such a struggle that the leader of the majority faction lamented
to his brother-in-law that "My own position as leader in marshalling my forces, and
keeping up their courage, against a domineering Chief, and a party in court who have
been accustomed to carry everything their own way, has been such a strain on my
brain and nervous system as I never wish to encounter again." FAnuAN, op. cit.
supra note 59, at 170.
106. FMAmAN, op. cit. supra note 59, at 256. Chase died in May, and Miller was
prominently mentioned as his possible successor.
107. Id. at 52.
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area that the Court attracted public attention and courted political
danger. "There is not much talent in [the Court]," Miller wrote.
"There is much Prejudice, or rather pre-occupation. There is much
political feeling of which perhaps I have my share."1as While
Miller's comment as to talent is merely typical of Miller, otherwise
it well describes the situation throughout Chase's tenure. With the
"old set" 10 9 by and large rigidly adhering to a position antagonistic
to the party dominating outside political events, and the "new set"
just as rigidly taking at least a permissive stand, Chase as Chief
had to preside over a factionalized group. Of course, he could not
completely play the part of neutral moderator, even had he by
nature been inclined to so passive a role-which he obviously was
not. He had to vote and take sides. The rigidity of opinion on
political issues is no better illustrated than in the affair of the
Missouri test oath.
Individual Justices presented Chase with specialized difficulties
in exercising leadership. David Davis probably had not a dram of
kindly disposition toward Chase when he came on the Court. Al-
though personal contact would move him away from his initial
hatred, some reservations would remain. For example, the epitome
of wild political ambition to Davis resided in Stephen A. Douglas.
While Chase lay stricken with his 1870 stroke and his return to the
Court was uncertain, Davis wrote that "Chase is the most ambitious
man, except Douglas, that I ever knew personally."" 0
Justice Samuel Miller was also a problem. Serene in his self-
confidence, Miller could never quite understand why anyone other
than himself should lead, or anyone else's position be followed in
preference to his own. Yet, he was popular on the Court, and his
elevated view of his own ability was probably not much exaggerated.
His independence of mind is shown by the volume of his written
dissents. Even Chase testified to his "dominant" influence within
the Court, "felt by the Court more than any other.""' Able, self-
assured almost to a fault, jealous of the very idea that anyone other
than himself should be a leader, Miller was probably a problem to
every Chief he sat under."2
The impulsive, able and probably unscrupulous Stephen J. Field
was never known to make for harmony. A showboat who always
108. Ibid. "Perhaps" seems a mild term for Miller to use.
109. The other Justices' term describing Clifford, Nelson and Grier. Field was, of
course, at least a spiritual member of the group, and Davis sometimes sided with it.
110. KiNc, op. cit. supra note 41, at 276-77. Letter of November 30, 1870.
111. F nlmrmss, op. cit. supra note 59, at 3. See also pp. 62 & 88-89 infra for an
estimate of Miller's dissents and influence on the Court.
112. Except, of course, Taney, who was not on the bench very often either term
Miller sat during his Chief-Justiceship.
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responded to a full courtroom with a great, too obvious display of
industriousness," 3 he had firm, in many ways, absolutist beliefs to go
with his impulsive nature.114 Among the "old set," Clifford and Grier
were distinct characters. Clifford's obstinancy of opinion and fondness
for attention (he, too, was a stand-out showboat before a full court
gallery) did not lead him to an inclination to follow another indi-
vidual's lead. Grier, described by Lincoln's Attorney General Edward
Bates as a "natural-born vulgarian, and, by long habit, coarse and
harsh,"" 5 also had a fiery temper, one manifestation of which has
already been seen, and a marked lack of understanding of how his
outbursts affected others.
The circumstances under which Strong and Bradley were appointed
could scarcely have been expected to make for ease between them
and their Chief. Swayne had been one of Chase's leading rivals for
the Chief's chair in 1864, and Chase was the political enemy of
Swayne's political friends in Ohio. All of which did not make Chase's
relations with Swayne completely easy.
Chase's personality was in some ways a bar to his exercise of
effective leadership. As Miller put it, "he liked to have his own
way,"" 6 and his experience had mainly been as an administrator
who gave orders, not as a collaborator. His naturally aloof appearance
and other personal traits would certainly keep him from being a
back-slapping, happy-spirited leader in the pattern of John Marshall.
His continued espousal of outside causes was not precisely cal-
culated to gain his brethren's approbation. The vastly increased
case load which obligated the Court reporter to issue two fat volumes
per year beginning with the December 1867 term, could have scarcely
made his colleagues look at his outside interests with delight, no matter
how hard he himself worked. Yet, the fact of the matter was that
Chase first performed his Court duties, and then pursued his other
interests, often at odd hours.
On top of a lifetime of arduous work, the outside causes he labored
for combined with the increasingly heavy duties of his office to
ruin his health. Chase's physical infirmities after a major stroke in
1870 prevented him from exercising his personal influence to the
degree he probably wished. Although he had complained of occa-
113. Smith, The Supreme Court and its Judges in Days Following the Civil War,
Washington Star, April 22, 1923, § 5, pp. 5-6.
114. See SwisR=, STEpEN J. FIELD 423 (1930) for an evaluation. Swisher makes
an interesting case study demonstrating these traits of Field's through the income tax
cases. Id. at 396-412.
115. The Diary of Edward Bates, IV ANNUAL REP. OF Ti= Am. HiSr. Ass'N 340
(Beale ed. 1930).




sional bad health, much as would anyone else, a pattern of illness
began in 1867 when he was struck by "the worst cold" he "ever had
in [his] life," lasting over a month." 7 In 1868, he became alarmed
over an irregular heart beat and became seriously ill shortly after
the Court adjourned in 1870. The stroke in August left marks which
never disappeared, and he may have shortened his life by returning
to hear the legal tender cases. Malaria, necessitating remedies almost
as disturbing as the disease, afflicted him the last year of his life,
as did other difficulties resulting from his weakened condition. His
health could only have made effective work more difficult. For
example, he felt it was two years before he returned to anything like
as effective a role as he had played in conference before the stroke."8
Always agonizingly careful as an opinion writer, after the stroke the
task must have been nearly unbearable. He noted in June, 1871, (to
his daughter) that it took him two hours to write a four-page letter
on small note paper." 9
The signs of his failing must have been obvious to the Court and
could scarcely have failed to excite the ambitions for his place that
Miller, Bradley, Strong and Swayne nursed. 20 After Morrison R.
Waite became Chief Justice, he was feted at a party attended by all
the Justices and three other candidates for the job. One of the lay-
hopefuls, Attorney General George H. Williams, remarked after
looking about, "did you ever see so many corpses at one funeral?"'21
Before they became corpses these four Justices were at least potential
vultures, circling around the failing Chase waiting for their chance.
Vultures seldom work together very well.
Chase had to face these difficulties. How he went about attempting
to exercise leadership where no dominant leader had existed since
Taney began to lose control of his Court around 1850 is a curious
blend of subtlety, utter wilfullness and personal integrity.
The first method Chase used was the traditional position of the
Chief Justice as opinion leader of the Court. Volumes 69 to 82 of
the United States Reports show Chase wrote more opinions than any
117. Letter From SPC to Nettie, March 8, 1867, Library of Congress, Chase MSS.,
Vol. 98.
118. Letter From SPC to Hiram Barney, July 12, 1872 and November 9, 1872,
Pennsylvania Historical Society, Chase Papers. Letter From Dr. John G. Perry to SPC,
December, 1872, Library of Congress, Chase MSS., Vol. 106.
119. Letter From SPC to Nettle, June 23, 1871, id. Vol. 103.
120. Both Swayne and Miller encouraged friends to push their candidacy when it
appeared Chase would not resume his duties in 1870. Bradley joined them as an
active candidate when Chase died in 1873, and Strong encouraged the mention of his
name in the right places. F Anur~, op. cit. supra note 59, at 265. Letter From
William Strong to MacVeagh, May 14, 1873. Pennsylvania Historical Society, J.
Wayne MacVeagh MSS.
121. Thu msP, CmuF JusTicE WA= 134 (1938).
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other member in every term except those when he was presiding
at the impeachment trial and after his stroke. Seldom did he write
in cases involving the common-law rights of litigants in private law.
Unquestionably he simply did not know enough law to venture into
these fields too often, nor was he very interested in such mundane
matters. As Justice Field later pointed out, he concerned himself
principally with litigation growing out of the war, of which there was
more than enough to keep him occupied." 3
The statistics show, for example, that of the sixty-four noteworthy
prize and confiscation cases, Chase wrote the majority opinion thirty-
three times. Of the twenty-two cases of importance in the areas of
general property rights (exclusive of the confiscation and prize cases)
and taxation and banking cases in which Chase was with the majority,
he wrote the opinion eight times. And, of the forty-one cases of
determining importance in public law when he had the opportunity
to speak for the Court, he spoke thirty-two times.124 Obviously, he
took upon himself the role of opinion leader in the area of public
and constitutional law.
He followed the procedure of writing initial opinions and then
leaving subsequent loose ends to be tied up by other members of
the Court in subsequent cases. For example, in spite of his great
personal interest in the Slaver Cases,"-5 after writing the leading
opinions he assigned the second wave of Slaver Cases to Clifford and
took Mrs. Alexander's Cotton,12 which involved important questions
under the Confiscation Acts, and was handed down on the same day.
Other of his enforced specialties were admiralty and prize law. This
was a touchy area of international relations, since often controversies
centering around seizures during the war involved the shipping of
European powers. Chase had to learn a good deal of admiralty law-
and be quite imaginative on occasion-but he handled most of the
122. A precise determination is impossible here. Mere announcements are some-
times very difficult to distinguish from short written opinions. Subtracting all apparent
announcements shows that during his term he wrote more opinions than any other
judge, writing thirty-five more than Clifford, forty-one more than Miller, and eighty-nine
more than the least productive Justice, Stephen J. Field. Before his stroke, he wrote
majority opinions in about twenty-two per cent of the cases. Of the cases he heard
during his entire tenure, he wrote opinions about nineteen per cent of the time. Nelson
wrote sixteen per cent of the opinions in cases he heard, followed by Clifford and
Miller. Of the healthy Justices, Davis, and especially Field, did not carry their share
of the case burden.
123. Som AccouNT OF a=m Worm OF ST=PHEN J. FEL 474 (Black & Smith eds.
1875).
124. These are the leading cases from the above-mentioned areas, plus cases
involving constitutional questions.
125. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 135 (1865).
126. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404 (1865).
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leading prize cases in a satisfactory, yet conciliatory, way. 27 This
threw him into close contact with the two specialists in this area,
Clifford and Nelson.
Obviously, for a man away from the concentrated practice of law
for almost fifteen years to carry so large a share of the Court's burden
required a great deal of work. Chase set an example for his Court
through his hard work. "When I am at the capitol I am always at
work," he wrote his daughter Nettie in 1867.128 In 1866, he proposed
to go through the basic legal treatises with his son-in-law, William
Sprague.' In the same letter he outlined his plans for the rest of
1866, which was before the case load of the Court became so
immense and before he assumed full circuit duties. He planned a
six-weeks vacation, after which he was to spend two weeks of
September and all of October and November "hard at work on my
cases,'" in preparation for the December term. He hoped to escape
from distractions "by taking rooms on Capitol Hill and studying in
the conference rooms." That he intended this as an example is indi-
cated by the way he reminded other Justices how hard he had to
"study."130
He tried to set an example in opinion writing. Drafts of opinions
in Chase manuscript collections show what a painstaking draftsman
he was.'3 ' "Yesterday," he wrote Nettie in 1866, "I spent at the
Consultation room writing an opinion." 132 Opinions resulted which
were terse, yet clear and forceful. Chase-hater that he became,
Rutherford B. Hayes characterized Chase's writing as "terse, elegant,
forcible and convincing." 1- In open Court, he not only appeared to
take copious notes, but surviving note pads show he paid close
attention to oral arguments and recorded accurate notes, writing
127. E.g., The Sea Witch, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 242 (1868); United States v. The
Schooner Jenny, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 183 (1868); The Science, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 180
(1868); The Volant, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 179 (1868); The Dashing Wave, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 170 (1868); The Springbok, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28 (1868); The Herald,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 768 (1866); The Hart, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 559 (1866); The Bermuda,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1866).
128. Letter From SPC to Nettie, April 4, 1867, Library of Congress, Chase MSS.,
Vol. 98.
129. Letter From SPC to William Sprague, July 25, 1866, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase Papers.
130. Letter From SPC to Samuel Miller, March 11. 1867, p. 35, Library of Congress,
Chase MSS., Letterbook.
131. Id. Vol. 99. Item nos. 5. 1495ff. Id. Vol. 107. Items nos. 16418, 16422, 16450,
16502, 16512.
132. Letter From SPC to Nettlie, May 19, 1866, id. at Vol. 97. (Emphasis added.)
133. 4 Wnu.mrs, THE DiAmY Am LE-rrTas OF RUTHERPoRD B. HAYEs 64 (1926).




out comments as he listened.13 4
Secondly, Chase took pains to get on good terms with his Court,
individually and collectively. And, apparently, he consciously took
steps to overcome the suspicion that he was attempting to be an
excessively domineering chief. The running correspondence between
Chase and Court Marshal Richard Parsons while the Chief Justice
was convalescing from his 1870 stroke offers an inside view of Chase's
close observations of his Court. Parsons apparently paid heed to
what Chase wrote him near the beginning of their correspondence.
"Nothing that concerns the Court or any member of it will be
uninteresting to me," 135 for each letter contained reports as to what
the Justices were doing. Where the judges were staying, what
entertainments they were attending and giving, even the cost of
their homes and their opinion of Chase's new house were objects
of Chase's interest.YS6
Surviving correspondence gives some indication of his relations
with individual judges, and how he made an attempt to inspire their
confidence. In 1865, when a case on circuit involved two possible
precedents, 37 Chase was disposed to the one which Clifford advo-
cated. So, he sent Clifford a copy of his opinion. Clifford not un-
expectedly agreed with Chase and hoped the case would be appealed.
If so, Clifford assured his Chief, "I shall be ready to lend my humble
assistance to support your views." That Chase was already on close
terms with this stern New Englander is indicated by Clifford's touch-
ing description of his son's illness, which was expected to be fatal. 38
To judge from the constant expressions of esteem which flowed
between Nelson and Chase, apparently Chase also enjoyed this
Justice's confidence. 139
As is by now abundantly evident, Justice Davis was a special
problem. Shortly after Chase came on the bench, he and Davis had
an altercation in open court as to rules governing notice to attorneys.
The following day, Chase announced that Davis had been correct.' 40
Apparently, Chase made considerable progress in his first two terms
in winning Davis' respect. When Chase sent Davis a copy of his
134. The Library of Congress, Chase MSS., Vol. 107. Item nos. 16520-36. Id. Vol.
108. Item nos. 16572ff.
135. Letter From SPC to R. C. Parsons, December 9, 1870, p. 67, id., Letterbook.
136. See, e.g., Letter From SPC to R. C. Parsons, December 15, 1870, p. 77, id.,
Letterbook. Letter From R. C. Parsons to SPC, December 12, 1870, id., Vol. 102.
137. The Mary Washington, 16 Fed. Cas. 1006 (No. 9229) (C.C.D. Md. 1865).
138. Letter From Nathan Clifford to SPC, April 21, 1865, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase Papers.
139. See, e.g., Letter From Samuel Nelson to SPC, October 20, 1870, Library of
Congress, Chase MSS., Vol. 102. Letter From . C. Parsons to SPC, item no 15631, id.
("Judge Nelson sends his warmest regards.")
140. 2 BROWNiG, op. cit. supra note 10, at 61 (entry of February 14, 1866).
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conciliatory address to the North Carolina bar in 1867-which Chase
must have known agreed with Davis' own opinion-he also took
occasion to apologize for the altercation. Davis wrote a long reply,
much of which bears repeating.
I have learned to like and esteem you, and if I was allowed to speak for
my brethren, I think I could say you had been growing in their confidence
and attachment, ever since yr. accession to the bench. You certainly have
in mine. No one ever questioned yr. ability.... My intercourse with you
has satisfied me [that] you have a good heart, and that considerations of
hatred, malice, or revenge would never influence you on any question....
In all differences of opinion, I feel assured that each of us will do justice
to the motives of the other. The little matter of notice to attorneys on
which we differed, and which for the moment may have affected our
feelings toward each other has long ago been forgotten. It left no sting
with me, and it did not need the assurance of your letter to satisfy me
that it left none with you, for your bearing towards me has been uniformly
kind and considerate .... 141
Note that Davis comes right to the point, almost admitting what
Chase already knew, that Davis had suspected him of "hatred, malice"
and "revenge," but that since being together on the bench, a new view
was being taken of him. Chase, for all his habits of imperiousness,
obviously had been very careful in his "bearing" toward all the
judges. And finally, Davis avoids mentioning the two strong reser-
vations he had about Chase to the end of his life, his ambition and
his ability as a lawyer.
That Davis wrote an honest letter is bolstered by later conduct.
After the Democratic Convention of 1868 failed to nominate Chase,
Davis wrote Justice Clifford, complaining in near bitter terms at the
failure to adopt the Chief Justice as a candidate.142 In 1871 he
accepted and acted on Chase's volunteered "advice" and issued a
writ of habeas corpus. One of Chase's relatives felt free to call on
Davis to ask that he get her a Federal job and he agreed to help
her.143 Chase wrote Judge C. C. Church in 1872 that Davis "is my
friend and I hold him in the highest esteem as a man of honor and
ability. I differ from him on some important points of principle,
but do not question the integrity of his convictions; nor, I think,
does he question mine."'4 Chase's description of his relationship
with this former enemy would seem in general to be accurate. It
141. Letter From Davis to SPC, August 12, 1867, Library of Congress, Chase MSS.,
Second Series, Vol. 3.
142. Maine Historical Society, Nathan Clifford MSS. Letter From David Davis to
Clifford, November 2, 1868. Davis thought the failure to nominate Chase was evidence
that although "The Democratic Party in ancient times had wisdom, lately it has none."
143. Letter From David Davis to SP0, September 1, 1871, Library of Congress,
Chase MSS., Vol. 104.
144. Letter From SPC to C. C. Church, March 26, 1872, p. 62, id., Letterbook.
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also illustrates what a survey of the correspondence between Chase
and his associates demonstrates, that the fierce Legal Tender in-
fighting left no debilitating scars on the Court as a whole.
With Miller, Chase enjoyed a cordial relationship in the first few
years, which evidently cooled as Chase was revealed as more con-
servative than had been suspected and as the two became antagonists
within the Court. At any rate, from a frequent correspondent on
whom Chase strongly relied for advice, Miller disappeared from
Chase's letterbook and Chase turned increasingly to Nelson and
Clifford for counsel-whom he well knew were usually in agreement
with him.
Miller could scarcely have been pleased with the way Chase
passed him by in majority assignments. In important property, taxa-
tion and banking cases, cases involving Southern problems including
confiscation and the prize cases, Chase had eighty-two chances to
assign majority opinions to Miller, but the strong-minded Iowan re-
ceived only three opportunities from his chief to speak. Nelson was
assigned twelve times. On the other hand, Chase was uncommonly
willing to silently acquiesce to Miller's dissenting opinions when both
were in the minority. Seven separate times the two were together
in dissent in the categories of property, taxation and banking and
cases of determining importance. Six times Chase allowed Miller to
write without competition.1 45 Such treatment could scarcely have
helped bridge the gap which progressively widened between these
two egotistical and able men. Miller, Charles Fairman notes, wrote
majority opinions in twice as many important constitutional cases
as the average Justice during his career. Had Chase lived, the
number would not have been so impressive.
With Field, Chase apparently felt somewhat uneasy. At least,
Field's description of Chase as a person strongly indicates that Field
never got close to him. Nevertheless, of all the Justices on the bench
with Chase, Field gave the most glowing report of his character
and influence, 46 and Chase reciprocated in a rather typical letter of
personal esteem in 1866.147 In the Chase-Parsons correspondence,
Field is reported as expressing affection and concern for Chase more
often than any other Justice.148
Chase dealt with the infirmed, yet ill-tempered, Justice Grier in
a kind, yet often firm manner. As Grier's health faded badly after
145. The seventh was Milligan.
146. Sovm AccouNT OF = WoRK OF SrxPI-- J. FIELD 474.
147. PIATr, MmOaRES OF IE MEN WHO SAvED T UmoN 128-29 (1887).
148. See, e.g., Letter From R. C. Parsons to SPC, December 2, 1870, Library of




1866, Chase went well out of his way to arrange Crier's quarters in
the Court to his best advantage, even to the point of volunteering
to bring a couch for him into the conference room.149 Chase watched
his impetuous colleague rather closely, and on at least two occasions
asked him to alter or withdraw dissenting opinions.150 In an 1868
case Grier, as he put it, "hastily" wrote "in great wrath at what I
considered an unjust decision." He added that he saw "it is capable
of a construction offensive to my brethren.... I thank you for return-
ing it to me and take the liberty to withdraw it altogether from the
files." 151 Griers scathing dissent in Texas v. White as it appears in
the Reports apparently is more gentle than the original. Chase took
offense, wrote Grier telling him he did, and suggested some "amend-
ments" to the dissent. Grier apologized and sent Chase's note to the
Court reporter with instructions to make the changes Chase sug-
gested. 5 2 The pattern of cautious ingratiation which Chase followed
was repeated with Bradley and Strong.153
In his dealings with his Court as a group of individuals, Chase
cannily took advantage of his opportunities to demonstrate his good
will-and play the game according to the rules. He seems to have
felt his way slowly into the task, relying to a large extent on his own
good qualities-which he doubted he possessed only in moments of
religious reflection-to win the esteem of his colleagues. Apparently,
he was careful in conversation, or else Field would not have made
the following statement.
During my whole association with him for over eight years, I never heard
him utter an unkind word of a single human being, although his conversa-
tion was frequently of persons who at that time were assailing his conduct
and maligning his motives. I doubt whether so much can be said truthfully
of any other man of this generation.
The intimacy of years only augmented admiration for his abilities and
respect for his character.154
149. Letter From R. C. Grier to SPC, October 22, 1866, id. at Vol. 97. Pennsylvania
Historical Society, Chase MSS., Letterbook. Letter From SPC to R. C. Crier, October
20, 1866, p. 371. Id., Chase Papers. Letter from R. C. Grier to SP, October 9,
1866.
150. Chase apparently kept a close watch over what the Reporter planned to print.
151. Letter From R. C. Grier to SPC, May 28, 1868, Library of Congress, Chase
MSS., Vol. 100.
152. Letter From R. C. Grier to SPC, April 28, 1869, id. at Vol. 101. Texas
v. White is not mentioned by name in the letter. The only other dissent he could
possibly have been referring to would have been in Doe o. Considine, which
preceded Texas v. White by over a year. In that case, Crier's dissent is innocuous,
and aimed at an opinion by Swayne. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 458, 481 (1868). Since
Grier's acidic verbiage in McCardle does not appear in the Reports, it is not unlikely
that Chase had it removed as well.
153. Letter From SPC to R. C. Parsons, December 9, 1870, and December 15, 1870,
pp. 66 and 67. Library of Congress, Chase MSS., Letterbook.
154. SomE Accotmv OF =HE Womc OF Smpsnmn J. FmLD 468, 475-76.
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In a private letter, Justice William Strong came to roughly the
same conclusion, referring to Chase as a "great and upright man."
Strong, interestingly enough, blames all the continuing accusations
against himself growing out of the legal tender controversy not on
Chase, but on "the chief Justice's family and, especially, his biogra-
pher"'5 --a more than generous estimate. Chase was generally more
than fair in evaluating his enemies and had the gift of forgetting
antagonism against even the most underhanded. Even Edwin M.
Stanton received generous verbal treatment, for example. 156 However,
Chase was certainly much more careful within the Court than he
had ever been before.
As the Justices were generally scattered attending to their circuit
responsibilities from May till December, Chase made a most adroit
use of the opportunity to consult his court by mail. In the matter
of the circuit allotment in 1866, for example, he consulted with every
Justice. In numerous other matters he consulted with one or several
Justices. He did not, however, merely state the problem and ask
for an opinion on matters he considered important. He stated his
view at well-prepared length and put his brethren in the position of
having to argue against and overrule him.157 From a Circuit case
we know Chase used this device at least once in conference, 158 and
the notes he took on oral argument gave him the raw material enabling
him to enter conference very well prepared. William Strong recalls
how he could argue with "great power" on "semi-politicar' topics,
which were the ones Chase was really interested in-and knew some-
thing about. The indications are that Chase, having built up a respect-
ful working relationship with most Justices, used his priority to initiate
subjects with considerable success in discussion.
Mr. Justice Miller wrote five years after Chase's death that when
Chase
came upon the bench it was admirable to see how quietly and courteously
155. Letter From William Strong to William M. Evarts, September 10, 1874, Library
of Congress, Misc. MSS., William Strong.
156. Chase had felt the back of this most devious gentleman's hand, and had
washed his own hands of the former Secretary of War. Yet, upon Stanton's death,
Chase wrote Schuckers: "He had faults-who has not! But he had great merits and
rendered vast if not unqualified service to the country in trying days." Letter From
SPC to J. W. Schuckers, December 27, 1869, Library of Congress, Chase MSS., Second
Series, Vol. 3.
157. Letter From SPC to all Justices, October 5, 1866, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase Papers (1864-72).
158. The fourteenth amendment disqualified many Southern State Judges from their
offlces. The validity of sentences made by these judges was disputed. On circuit
Chase upheld their validity, adding to his opinion that he was "authorized to say"
that the Justices of the Supreme Court "unanimously concur in this opinion." Caesar
Griffin's Case, 11 Fed. Cas. 7 (No. 5815) (C.C.D.Va. 1869).
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the Court resisted his imperious will, never coming to direct conflict, and
he finally had to take the position which he held .. . the Moderator and
presiding officer over the Supreme Court, and not possessed of any more
authority than the rest of the Bench chose to give him.15 9
In a way, this estimate is truistic. The Chief Justice has only a
certain amount of explicit authority. On paper, this is largely the
power of a chairman of a board in constant session, who may use his
position to gain as much influence as he can, but who does not
necessarily gain influence by the position. 160 If Chase had any inten-
tion of being the overt boss of the Court, he soon realized that was
impossible. Chase, who was after all a politician of considerable
skill, then fell back on ways and means of exerting influence through
his own personality and ability, augmented by the subtle tools at his
disposal. As Chief, he had access to more information than any other
member of the Court through a wide and carefully nurtured informa-
tion net in the lower judiciary. He and Miller and Davis maintained
close contacts with political events, but as much of Chase's circuit
was near Washington, he had the advantage of being in the Capital
more often. He had the opportunity to assign opinion writers and
he alone kept in contact with all the Justices as individuals as a
matter of normal procedure. In addition, he was Salmon P. Chase,
one of the most formidable public figures of the day, so he had
the weight of his own prestige outside the courtroom making his
support, both as Salmon Chase and Chief Justice, something worth
compromising for in conference. In short, it appears that Chase used
most of the tools which his position made available so as to be willful
in a skillful manner. How successful he was in specific instances is
quite another question.
There are instances of record in which members of the Court
relied on Chase. Davis and Swayne both followed his lead in habeas
corpus cases. Clifford once asked Chase about an important tax case.
Nelson had already decided the point at law in circuit court contrary
to Clifford's view. "Will you suggest what you think I had better
do," Clifford asked. "I will be greatly obliged if you will write
me upon the subject."
161
The Court as a whole seems to have relied on Chase in such
matters as formulating a consistent rule regulating the execution
159. FrAm_.";, op. cit. supra note 115, at 94.
160. For a more detailed and excellent analysis on this point, see MunPHY, ThE
ELENMNTS OF JTDicrAL STRATEGY 82-89 (164). Unfortunately, this article was
drafted before I read Professor Murphy's book.




of final decrees 16 and Reconstruction matters in general. Chase
wrote the decisions avoiding a liberal interpretation of the 1867
amendment to the 25th section of the Judiciary Act which seemed to
open completely the Court's jurisdiction over state causes. He had
to perform some gymnastics, but he managed to avoid a decision on
this Reconstruction measure until after the white-hot portion of
Radical domination was past. 163 All this being true, it is nevertheless
on the crucial matters of the day that Chase's effectiveness must
be judged.
What successes can be attributed to Chief Justice Chase? In the
area of Reconstruction and questions growing out of the war the most
illuminating example is the handling of habeas corpus questions.
Most of the tools of a Chief Justice with resourcefulness enough to
apply them can be seen. A case Lincoln worried about in February
1865, was withdrawn at the suggestion of Maryland District Judge
William Giles before Chase's identical advice reached him. Giles
not unreasonably felt the case should not be tried during the turmoil
subsequent to Lincoln's assassination.'" It did not appear again.
In January 1866, Chase turned down a petition for habeas corpus on
the grounds that such a petition should be addressed "to a Court
Judge of the United States in the District within which the prisoner
was held."16
5
No Supreme Court Justice was involved in a habeas corpus matter
in the South before 1869. A Maryland attorney's plea for Chase to
entertain a petition in December 1866, fell on deaf ears.166 Milligan
came to the Court through Justice Davis' long-time preoccupation
with martial law in the North, which was at least less volatile than a
case directly dealing with Reconstruction. Mississippi v. Johnson
and related cases came up through an appeal in equity and the only
habeas corpus case to reach the Court from the South before 1869,
McCardle, came up through a specific Reconstruction statute. No
other habeas corpus cases reached the Court during the high-tide
of radical Reconstruction, and one must suspect that Chase worked
effectively to achieve this result.
162. Letter From SPC to William Giles, May 31, 1867, p. 166, Library of Congress,
Chase MSS., Letterbook.
163. Justice Miller finally interpreted the amendment away in the comparative
safety of 1875. 3 WA.umE, op. cit. supra note 38, at 402-05. See, e.g., West v. Aurora,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 139 (1868).
164. Letter From William Giles to SPC, April 17, 1865, Library of Congress, Chase
MSS., Vol. 95.
165. Pennsylvania Historical Society, Chase MSS., Letterbook. To "Dear Judge,"
January 5, 1866, p. 468. (The index of the letterbook lists a letter to Giles as
appearing on this page.)
166. Letter From S. Ridgely to SPC, December 28, 1866, Library of Congress,
Chase MSS., Vol. 98.
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In the relative calm of 1869, Chase was ready to get a southern
habeas corpus case before the Court. In the Yerger controversy,
Chase covered his bets quite well. He turned for advice, and prior
commitment, to Nelson and Clifford, not to the entire Court. From
these two, he knew what the answer to his question, do "I have the
power" to entertain a habeas corpus position outside my circuit
would be. 6 7 He then turned to District Judge Hill and gave him
advice which absolutely precluded any refusal to either grant the
petition or allow an appeal, unless that judge disregarded the Chief
Justice's admonition, "your duty is a necessary inference from your
authority."168 Such explicit "advice" was unlikely to be disregarded.
Chase was able to get his colleague in the South, Justice Wayne,
to agree not to hold circuit court, and apparently the acquiescence
of the Court itself grounded his position firmly. His determination
to interpret the confiscation and amnesty statutes so as to give them
"such a liberal construction as will give effect to the beneficent inten-
tion of Congress"-of which Congress was unaware-and his defense
of the pardoning power of the President was ratified by the Court, as
was his general policy of leniency toward the South in all matters
but Negro suffrage as enunciated on circuit in Shortridge v. Macon.169
Perhaps the unanimous decision in Mississippi v. Johnson should
be catalogued as a striking success. Chase was obviously pleased at
the "beneficent" effect of the decision. It was unanimous, and of the
"new set" he alone had any perceptible influence with all of the "old
set." The none-too-graceful but highly expedient retreat in McCardle
saw only Grier and Field keep the Court from unanimity. In light of
the heat of the controversy and the ominous signs that the Justices
were preparing to go down together on the case, the wonder of it
is that only Grier and Field refused to duck the issue. It is worth
noting that after the Test Oath Cases, the Court, whether ruling the
way the radicals wished or not, ruled with near unanimity on politi-
cally explosive cases.
Chase undoubtedly exerted his influence in favor of the assertive
path the Court took after 1868. In light of the Court's personnel,
perhaps this should be cited as a negative leadership success in that
167. Letter From SPC to Nathan Clifford and Samuel Nelson, June 22, 1869, Penn-
sylvania Historical Society, Chase MSS.
168. Letter From SPC to Robert A. Hill, June 23, 1869, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Chase MSS.
169. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1869); see, e.g.,
Armstrong's Foundry v. United States, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 766 (1868); United States
v. Nelson Anderson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 56 (1870); McKee v. Rains, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
22 (1870); Bigelow v. Forest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 359 (1870); United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). See also, DonRns, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER
LxNcoLN AND JoHNsoN chs. 14 and 17 (1953).
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he merely did not try to stop the Court. Certainly, however, he
helped propel the Court in this direction.
There were also failures in leadership. The most obvious one,
perhaps, is the legal tender controversy when Chase led the Court
to invalidate that act, and then precipated an intra-Court fight which
spilled into public view, attempting to prevent a reversal when two
new Justices changed his five man majority to a four man minority.
Several other cases should probably be added to the failure side of
the ledger. The most obvious example being the test oath chaos in
1866. Milligan might be added to the list. It should be noted in
both these matters that the positive positions of the members of the
Court would probably have precluded a John Marshall from any
success. Both cases were decided, also, before congressional reaction
against the Court's attitude began. The danger of the situation which
these cases revealed must have been a great help in achieving unity.
It should also be recalled that Chase attempted to limit Milligan
to a construction of the statute involved, and that this could have
been a factor in winning Justice Wayne to his side. One wonders
what the result of the case would have been had it not involved a
question which Davis had long since determined must be settled for
all time at the first opportunity. No matter how determined each
member was to carry out his views, the Court as a whole was con-
siderably split in these cases.
It should be noted also that Chase was not able to convince the
Court that federal authority should be interpreted broadly under the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. His conduct indi-
cates that he felt a door should be left ajar in case the states com-
pletely frustrated his racial aims. Hence, his objection in Crandall
v. Nevada'70 to Miller's failure to rest his decision on a broad inter-
pretation of the rights of a United States citizen which could be
protected under the commerce clause. By 1867, Chase must have
known that Miller's narrow opinion would spell trouble for the
privileges and immunities of United States citizens protected by the
fourteenth amendment.' 7i Chase claimed suffrage for the freedmen
while the states were being reconstructed. By the time explicit
definition of this clause came to the Court, Chase was too ill to
write an opinion, 2 though he hoped to do so in Bradwell v. Illinois.'3
Considering how important the matter was to him, perhaps it should
170. 73 U.S. (6 Wal.) 35 (1867).
171. Which Chase probably had a hand in writing. His proposed text is very
nearly identical with the final version. J mms, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AM- I m T 526 (1956); PiATT, op. cit. supra note 146, at 130-31.
172. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 136 (1873).
173. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
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be listed as a failure, although one wonders what the outcome would
have been had Chase lived in good health. Both these later cases
were decided five to four.
Throughout his term, Chase never lost his sense of independence,
recording dissents in thirty-three cases, the same number as justice
Miller. The interesting fact is that Chase seldom called attention
to his dissents by writing an opinion. Never timid or weak-minded,
perhaps it can be inferred that he realized he would invoke a
detrimental effect on his leadership in the Court if he paraded his
disagreements to an outside world always glad, either from admiration
or distrust, to pay attention to what he said. For example, displeased
as he was at Nelson's reasoning in Georgia v. Stanton, which left the
door open to a challenge to Reconstruction through equity, in the
heat of political 1868 he merely stated very briefly his dissent from
the reasoning. It may be that the fact of his recording dissents
thirty-three times, but going beyond the mere act of recording on
only nine occasions is the most revealing fact of all. It must show
that Chase learned on the bench at least some of the utility of holding
his own tongue.
That Justice Miller was often opposed to Chase within the Court
and came to regard him as an enemy seems well established. Perhaps
some measure of Chase's impact within the Court can be gained by
looking at what his chief rival said about him. On one occasion the
unmodest Miller remarked that he had "often said" he knew "of no
one against whom I should undertake to measure myself with more
diffidence than Chase." 174 Again, Miller, after listing to his brother-
in-law Chase's bad qualities, added, "but he was a great man and a
better man than public life generally leaves one, after forty years of
service."175 Like Caesar, praise from Miller is praise indeed. The
man who receives such a recommendation must have had an impact-
and he must have understood the leadership potential the position
of Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court affords.
174. FAmnmAN, op. cit. supra note 115, at 94.
175. FAmnAN, op. cit. supra note 59, at 252.
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